Therefore, if you harvest the low-hanging fruits already before you have your whole project approved and funded, you reduce the remaining projects' benefits by much more than its costs, thus worsening both indicators and thus your project's attractiveness to investors. Similarly, if you inflate the scope of HFR to get closer to HSR, you will make it much less likely that HFR will ever be succeeded by HSR. Therefore, I believe that the cost and travel time estimates we are debating here represent a careful balance, but one would be foolish to not give in to a potential investor's insistence to increase the scope - one would just need to make sure that the extra improvements boost rather than reduce the BCR and IRR of HSR...
In a broad way, VIA's strategy is, let us demonstrate what we can do on the Ottawa line and leverage from that credibility to propose better things in some future decade. Given government attitudes, I can't fault that strategy. I'm sure the BCR is being prepared to create the best possible outcome from the Ottawa line towards that objective.
It's fairly easy to accept (notwithstanding our angst over curves and trip time) that the Toronto-Ottawa segment will be fast enough to go beyond the "low hanging fruit" of non-driving students and seniors for whom trip time is less critical, and into the more demanding market of business travellers and those for whom travel is time sensitive.
It's harder to believe that VIA is able to harvest anything more than the low-hanging fruit from the Toronto-Montreal market, ie only attracting the least time sensitive customers, and foregoing whatever customers who might only buy a train ticket if there were a more direct, faster route. It's a challenge to believe that the Havelock route could ever be upgraded enough to plumb the latter market to an aggressive degree.
The problem is that the most probable strategies for generating a BCR for direct Montreal-Toronto service requires intrusion into freight railways' "private" affairs. That is clearly a non-starter under current government policy, but it is really not that sacred an issue IMHO.
It's just a perverse thing of VIA's strategy that in order to win at all, Via must preclude winning between the most populous city pairs that represent a huge source of growth.
Would Toyota adopt a business strategy that precluded selling Lexus, in order to sell more Corollas? Maybe, if the BCR pointed in that direction. The difference is that VIA is the executor of transportation policy first, and only a business second. The more HFR takes its business strategy in this direction, the worse the result will be as an infrastructure strategy.
Hopefully VIA will share more informed and expert analysis of its markets in due course. We amateurs can only speculate. The thing to watch is, what are they saying about the Montreal-Toronto market, and why is connecting the two largest cities in Central Canada only a secondary consideration?
- Paul