VIA Rail

[crs1026]

No I was just throwing a number out there.

It would probably be closer to $3 billion or so for the tunnel, since you cant just tunnel where the existing tunnel is, youd have to bypass the above ground portion of the REM as well all the way to the A40 station where the Mascouche line now terminates.

Still, a huge chunk of change to save 20 minutes over the Senetterre routing.

I have no clue about how far below ground the current tunnel is, or what emergengy exits it has (beyond knowing that Mount Royal is pretty tall in pictures!). Still, I would think the cost of a new bore might be lower, based on what tunnelling Toronto’s subways and LRT are said to cost. Of course, even a $2B tunnel would be hard to sell.

Those 20 minutes matter for two reasons:. One, if the 15+ Quebec trains each way are ported onto the same line as the 15+ Ottawa-Toronto trains at Ballantyne, CN’s freight capability through Turcot- Lachine will be that much more constrained, and VIA will have to spend more money there to protect CN’s interests. Less money than a tunnel, I’m sure, but there will be a cost. Two, that added time is material to marketability. VIA’s “frequency sells” premise only works so far - speed can’t be traded off without a price.

Perhaps some fraction of the cost of a tunnel could be better spent elsewhere on a full 125 mph segment that would recoup some of those 20 minutes - a more cost effective compromise solution. And, if there were a station that gave a convenient connection to REM, the link to Trudeau Airport might still be marketable to long distance flyers as an alternative to flying M-Q.

I wonder what the cost of putting VIA on REM will be....it will be non-trivial. Maybe there is some amount that REM would pay VIA as a cost effective incentive to VIA staying out of REM’s way.

- Paul

 

[Urban Sky]

I think we might be misunderstanding reach other. My point here is that a segment that has the potential to create a new market is worth the additional spending. And I mean substantial spending, which includes straightening out those problematic curves.

Admittedly might be a difference of opinion in how we see investment. I think ROI should drive capital commitment. And usually, if there's a project where you can create a captive market, ROI is decent.

b) Where is the business case that says 1:35 is the optimal timing ? Suppose another X million could bring the timing down to (hypothetically) 1:20? What is the ROI on that increment? I would hope that VIA has not taken 1:35 as cast in stone.

The main thing to understand about HFR at this stage is that nothing is set in stone so far: the only thing which matters is that the whole thing gets actually build, while the question of "how" is of much more secondary importance. Therefore, as capital cost has so far been reliably the factor which derailed any HxR project, VIA has decided to design the least costly project, which still achieves travel times which are competitive against the car (as the default choice in the Corridor) and requires only a short construction period without lengthy negotiations with current property/ROW owners or nearby residents. That's why the maximum speed is 110 (and not: 125) mph, that's why Montreal-Toronto has been merged with Montreal-Ottawa and Ottawa-Toronto and that's why Peterborough was chosen over the Lakeshore route. However, it has always been clear that what will actually be built depends almost exclusively on the investors' preferences: if they prefer 125 mph, it will be 125 mph. If they prefer to go through Tweed, there will a station in Tweed (with limited service, just like at other marginal Corridor stations), if they prefer a bypass around Tweed, there will be a bypass around Tweed. If they want to go to Quebec, then there will be the north shore extension to Quebec, and if they want to build a branch to Sudbury through Ottawa valley, then this opens up new ideas for how to reroute the Canadian...

You left yourself wide open on that one, and I'm just too something to let it go - mostly in jest, but ..... the reality is that much of the GTA's transit planning has been napkin-thin, for decades now.

It's not different in my province of residence by choice and that's why I'm happy to work at a federal crown corporation, despite having to endure its bureaucracy, which will survive any elections completely unbothered...

There's no doubt that VIA is doing an above average amount of due diligence on the project. Still, I think we ought to see more of the sums, and are not being unreasonable to offer laypersons' opinions in the absence of the detail. Trust implies verification. There is both an investor interest and a public policy interest in this project, and the government owes it to the public to show the detail.

Thank you for noticing! Once VIA has secured seriously committed investors, the exact scope will be determined and the appropriate EA and consultation processes will be started. We only have to look out of our windows at VIA HQ at the construction site for a major transit project currently under construction to understand why it is so important to not shortcut these processes (also, we lack the political buddies which would hastily change the laws to help speeding up our project).

Three things - I suspect you may not be able to comment in specifics, but

a) Can we assume that the $91M allocation addresses whatever impediments caused VIA to adjust its timings from 1:35 to present day?

You can expect that the $91M is what well-reputed specialist engineering firms have determined to be the minimum cost (including contingency) to achieve the advertised travel times.

[...]
b) I am surprised that amid all this due diligence, it is suggested that adding capacity east of De Beaujeu is not factored in or planned in the initial phase.

VIA plans increasing the current frequencies, therefore "adding capacity east of De Beaujeu" is certainly factored in.

At present CN runs 6 weekday trains each way to Toronto and 4 to Ottawa (with a fifth on Sundays).

CN intends to abandon their tracking rights in the region of Ottawa.

HFR will raise that to (per the documents) 15 each way and perhaps more (per our sidewalk speculation). It seems quite likely that CN will expect some further investment to protect its own capacity. I can't imagine CN not insisting that appropriate capacity be built before HFR is begun , especially if timings are being reduced and hence operating delays will be less tolerable. Moreover, leaving this investment to the variability of freight business and CN's judgement is risky - we know that taking a "wait and see" basis will push the decision to a breaking point, where CN will begin to favour freight over passenger as congestion develops in the future. That's a threat to revenue. How do we know that the added money will be available when CN requires it? What is the impact on the ROI if more is done right away?

Even though VIA will continue to rely on CN for providing a route onto the Island of Montreal, they don’t own all available routes...

It's also really not that significant if you work in government. Maybe because I'm in the military and billion dollar projects are the norm around here, we don't count anything as really substantial unless you're staffing a Memorandum to Cabinet. Everything before the MC is simply pissing around trying to convince the big wigs that your idea will really, really work, for reals.....

When some of these assessments start coming in and they start drafting the MC, we'll know that there's some actual serious support in government for HFR. Also, I predict that Johannes will be so busy when this phase hits that we won't hear from him for months!

At this point, the government is not asked to provide the capital funds for this project. They are simply asked to allow its Crown Corporation to enter into negotiations with private investors.

I maybe the rare dissenter on this. I actually think there maybe a case for some commercial confidence for VIA to not make most of its analyses public. [...]

Everytime this kind of work gets released, public servants reach for the Tylenol, because the media just globs on to the negative points, ignoring the whole picture. And the nature of such analysis usually tends to highlight the risks more than the rewards.

I learnt this the hard way when I tried to provide a conservative estimate of the reports which have already been provided so far by external firms with slightly more real-life experience than VIA in designing, costing and overseeing the construction of rail infrastructure (to make the point the cost figures we are discussing are not some VIA HQ guesstimates) and it was immediately taken as the total scope of all studies ever conducted on HFR, both internally and externally...

I would like (hope to see) a detailed business case released in a year or two before they put out their RFP. It'd be nice to see what operational concepts and business models they considered. And how they stacked up after they actually have some ground truth on what it takes to build on the Havelock sub.

As I wrote earlier, there will be every due diligence and public consultation processes you would expect. This project is far too urgent to risk having it stuck in lengthy legal battles!

I just noticed they show stations for Tweed and Sharbot Lake. That should attract ones of passengers.

Ever since I discovered the location of Sharbot Lake within the lake after which it and a provincial park are named, I have been wanting to visit that place. I believe that even a single mid-day and a single evening stop (in both directions) could make wonders for making this leisure destination more accessible and popular...

The editorial that Paul mentioned:

Globe editorial: Ottawa’s romance with train travel, and how much it could cost you

Via today runs all passenger service between major Canadian cities. Last year, it lost $93-million on its busiest route – the Montreal-Ottawa-Toronto service. Over all in 2018, it carried 4.7-million passengers, had an operating loss of $272.6-million, and received $394-million in government...

www.theglobeandmail.com

The problem with almost every conclusion drawn by journalists or any member of the public from the financial performance figures provided in VIA’s Annual Report is that these figures include all of the Crown Corporation's overheads (including the salaries of HQ staff like myself), which is useful when trying to roughly estimate how VIA's operational subsidy spreads across the provinces it serves. However, they are a poor guide when trying to assess whether expanding or abandoning a service would be worthwhile, as a large chunk of what is reported as a routes’ operating expenses is rather insensitive to changes in the level of services offered on that specific route: when expanding that service, they will spread across more passengers, car miles or whatever cost drivers they are attributed to in detail, while when ditching that service they will be spread across the remaining services. The fact that VIA’s operating deficit decreased (even in absolute figures) while it expended its services at a scale not seen since the mid-1980s proves that expanding services on routes like Toronto-Ottawa or Montreal-Quebec creates value for the taxpayers (by serving more people with less subsidies)...

 

[kEiThZ]

VIA has decided to design the least costly project, which still achieves travel times which are competitive against the car (as the default choice in the Corridor) and requires only a short construction period without lengthy negotiations with current property/ROW owners or nearby residents. That's why the maximum speed is 110 (and not: 125) mph, that's why Montreal-Toronto has been merged with Montreal-Ottawa and Ottawa-Toronto and that's why Peterborough was chosen over the Lakeshore route. However, it has always been clear that what will actually be built depends almost exclusively on the investors' preferences: if they prefer 125 mph, it will be 125 mph.

This is intriguing and raises a few questions.

1) Were the travel times provided in the slide presentation the worst case scenario (for lack of a better term)? Or can they get even worse for the Havelock sub?

2) How much confidence do you folks have in that cost estimate? Have your outside consultants also helped with cost estimation? I think most are skeptical given past estimates ($1.5 billion for GO service to Peterborough). So it might be tough to digest $4.4 billion for such a long and complex corridor?

3) Do you have an internal list of "nice to haves" that you can show your investors? Essentially a list of where investment produces the greatest performance returns?

4) Are you analysing markets for commuter potential? I look at Ottawa-Montreal and Montreal-Quebec and see some real potential from commuters as HFR creates a market.

 

[crs1026]

The CIB pitch sounded much more like a mortgage or GIC offering than a hands-on equity ownership: invest and this is the return. The test that the market would apply is simpler - is this going to run in the black, and will the business deliver the promised (fixed) return? So long as the “dividend” is paid every quarter, the investment is a good one. Presumably if the venture does even better, the incremental return goes to the Bank, and thus indirectly to Canada. The problem that poses is - those decisions about whether to do 125 instead of 110 are made through the federal bureaucracy, and inevitably, its politicians. That doesn’t inspire confidence.

The “what the investor deems best” approach that @UrbanSky describes might appeal more to a Branson or Buffett than a Gates...it implies the investor has an interest and familiarity with running a railway, and the variables and levers that can be adjusted. The investor would make those decisions in a more informed manner and reap the added return. I hope the investment is being structured in that way.

- Paul

 

[Urban Sky]

I have no clue about how far below ground the current tunnel is, or what emergengy exits it has (beyond knowing that Mount Royal is pretty tall in pictures!). Still, I would think the cost of a new bore might be lower, based on what tunnelling Toronto’s subways and LRT are said to cost. Of course, even a $2B tunnel would be hard to sell.

It is almost impossible to exaggerate the monumental scale in financial cost and paralysis which building a second tunnel under the Mont-Royal would cause and that is much less so because of the mountain itself than by the layers of transportation infrastructure which crisscross the ground underneath and around the Gare Centrale:

At first sight, it may not look that difficult because the existing tunnel actually doesn't run under the center of McGill College Avenue but under the center of its northeastern half, if you compare this photo...

Source: Montreal Gazette

...with this Google Street View image of what is today the intersection of McGill Collegue and Cathcart:

The tunnel therefore runs roughly underneath the parked cars next to the yellow line (and I actually happen to know the building on the right very well, as it was right in the back of my first desk at the VIA HQ), which should allow the construction of a second tunnel underneath the other (southwestern) half of McGill College Avenue, right? Well, there are just two slight problems and both are caused by the REM project:

First, there is the slight complication that there will be a REM station at McGill Metro Station (and thus only a few hundred meters up McGill College Avenue), which will naturally extend well beyond the horizontal limits of the existing tunnel ...

Source: Newswire.ca

...and will leave very little space to fit a second tunnel between the Place Montreal Trust and the Eaton Center:

Adapted from: Montrealsvisitorguide.com

Secondly, staying southwest of the existing tunnel means that you would arrive onto tracks 7 and 8, which are reserved for storage by REM trains (which is the smallest issue), require a station entry on the western side (which will be expensive, but not impossible):

Adapted from: track layout posted by @nephersir7 as post #3,566 (i.e. some 150 pages back)

The bigger problem will be, however, to exit the Gare Centrale on its eastern side, as it is completely covered by three separate massive building (Place Ville-Marie, the Queen Elisabeth Hotel and the Place Bonaventure) and would require the removal of a significant number of supporting columns:

Adapted from: map posted by @nephersir7 as post #3,566

And even if you find a way out of Gare Centrale, you now would need to find a way to avoid the REM ROW (the lighter gray or more Southern pair of tracks), the ramp up to the parking levels of Place Bonaventure and the Edifice Rodier and New City Gas, with the latter two being listed buildings which already forced the CDPQ to completely replan the routing of this segment of the REM:

Adapted from: Openstreetmap.org

So what about going above or below the current ROW? Above, forget it, as there are buildings on top of Gare Centrale and the green line above the existing Mont-Royal tunnel (refer to the picture of McGill station further above).

As for going below the current ROW, there is the slight problem that the Autoroute Ville-Marie (think of the Gradiner Highway, but well hidden in a tunnel) happens to be the most complex just at the eastern end of Gare Centrale:

Adapted from: World Road Association

Just to give you an idea of how deep you would have to dig to avoid the Ville-Marie and Viger tunnel complex, it reaches until 42 meters under street level only 200 meters north of where VIA passengers leaving Gare Centrale view the daylight for the first time (exact location here):

Source: World Road Association

And we haven't even touched the question of where and how you want to build a full-size intercity terminal railway station anywhere underground and near Gare Centrale...

This is intriguing and raises a few questions.

1) Were the travel times provided in the slide presentation the worst case scenario (for lack of a better term)? Or can they get even worse for the Havelock sub?

2) How much confidence do you folks have in that cost estimate? Have your outside consultants also helped with cost estimation? I think most are skeptical given past estimates ($1.5 billion for GO service to Peterborough). So it might be tough to digest $4.4 billion for such a long and complex corridor?

3) Do you have an internal list of "nice to haves" that you can show your investors? Essentially a list of where investment produces the greatest performance returns?

4) Are you analysing markets for commuter potential? I look at Ottawa-Montreal and Montreal-Quebec and see some real potential from commuters as HFR creates a market.

I'm currently too tangentially involved in the HFR project to answer these questions and even if I was more closely involved, I would probably not feel compelled to volunteer any answers. All I can say is that the cost and travel time estimates have been of course provided by well-reputed engineering companies and that Ottawa-Montreal, Trois-Rivieres-Montreal or Peterborough-Toronto are without any doubt interesting commuter markets. And yes, the desires are always endless: continuous double-tracking would be an equally obvious and costly wish...

The CIB pitch sounded much more like a mortgage or GIC offering than a hands-on equity ownership: invest and this is the return. The test that the market would apply is simpler - is this going to run in the black, and will the business deliver the promised (fixed) return? So long as the “dividend” is paid every quarter, the investment is a good one. Presumably if the venture does even better, the incremental return goes to the Bank, and thus indirectly to Canada. The problem that poses is - those decisions about whether to do 125 instead of 110 are made through the federal bureaucracy, and inevitably, its politicians. That doesn’t inspire confidence.

The “what the investor deems best” approach that @UrbanSky describes might appeal more to a Branson or Buffett than a Gates...it implies the investor has an interest and familiarity with running a railway, and the variables and levers that can be adjusted. The investor would make those decisions in a more informed manner and reap the added return. I hope the investment is being structured in that way.

- Paul

Again, I'm too tangentially involved in the HFR to know who is calling the shots on the final design, but my suspicion would be that TC tries to micro-manage and downsize everything, while the CIB tries all they can to get their potential investors involved into these discussions (rather than having the bureaucrats at TC second-guess their needs and desires)...

 

[nephersir7]

The tunnel therefore runs roughly underneath the parked cars next to the yellow line (and I actually happen to know the building on the right very well, as it was right in the back of my first desk at the VIA HQ), which should allow the construction of a second tunnel underneath the other (southwestern) half of McGill College Avenue, right? Well, there are just two slight problems and both are caused by the REM project:

First, there is the slight complication that there will be a REM station at McGill Metro Station (and thus only a few hundred meters up McGill College Avenue), which will naturally extend well beyond the horizontal limits of the existing tunnel

Here's a cross section plan from the 10 year old AMT study to build a commuter rail station under McGill College. (west is right).
We can see that the underground parking of Place Montreal Trust extends under the street.

There was enough space to add a third track to the west (A) , but that probably won't be the case with the REM station. Not to mention the southern bottleneck near Place Ville-Marie.

At this point, it's more viable to explore the idea of extending the tunnel on the eastern side, following a suggestion from the 2007 Champlain Bridge LRT proposal:

The technical viability of this idea is at best uncertain, especially given that the feasibility of an extending the tunnel north of McGill station wasn't assessed. All that's mentioned is that the terminal station would have been 5m under the western end of the metro station.

 

[kEiThZ]

There's only two realistic solutions that I can see here:

1) Break of service. Montreal-QC trains operate from a different station. Most likely.

2) Work with REM. By this I mean, CDPQ gets an equity stake. And the CIB loans them whatever it takes to upgrade the tunnel to fit HFR physically and schedule wise. Ideal solution.

 

[crs1026]

It is almost impossible to exaggerate the monumental scale in financial cost and paralysis which building a second tunnel under the Mont-Royal would cause and that is much less so because of the mountain itself than by the layers of transportation infrastructure which crisscross the ground underneath and around the Gare Centrale:

Thank you for all that detail. I can appreciate that, while one might still muse about a tunnel, it's way beyond what HFR could afford as part of the first phase, with a constrained budget. More like something that would be part of a full scale HSR someday when its contribution to the overall project scope would not be so enormous.

There's only two realistic solutions that I can see here:

1) Break of service. Montreal-QC trains operate from a different station. Most likely.
2) Work with REM. By this I mean, CDPQ gets an equity stake. And the CIB loans them whatever it takes to upgrade the tunnel to fit HFR physically and schedule wise. Ideal solution.

1) would be an interesting experiment. If the transit connections were excellent, one might find that a north side station served a fair volume of passengers who whose last mile trek is not any different, or perhaps better, than going all the way to Central. However, given that VIA would likely use the MMC for maintenance, the option of looping around Montreal into Central might not add much cost or complexity. That would give the same-station option for travellers who prefer to stay on board for the extra time and distance. Or, perhaps every second train should cross the city, and end up at Dorval instead of downtown....same north end stop to serve downtowners, but an express link to the airport, and one-seat service to Ottawa. However, a single intercity hub is a hard thing to sacrifice.

2) I presume the issue is clearances at stations, rather than throughout the tunnel. I wonder whether a gantlet arrangement can be used. REM will use platform screens, so there is no safety issue in having VIA trains pass through....it's the clearance. I'm still hung up on having to procure a "slender" model train.

- Paul

 

[lrt's friend]

At the present time, VIA operates 4 trains each day between Ottawa and Quebec City via Montreal. This was designed to create a new market and increase ridership. It might work for M-Q service operating out of a north Montreal station but the elimination of O-Q trains will be a loss to VIA operations if it creates an inconvenient double transfer in Montreal. .

 

[smallspy]

Again, I'm too tangentially involved in the HFR to know who is calling the shots on the final design, but my suspicion would be that TC tries to micro-manage and downsize everything, while the CIB tries all they can to get their potential investors involved into these discussions (rather than having the bureaucrats at TC second-guess their needs and desires)...

Based on the interactions with TC of those who've been far more involved with them than I, I would suggest that your suspicions of TC are correct. They act far less as a regulatory body, and far more of a lobbyist for the freight railway industry than they have any right to.

Dan

 

[Urban Sky]

Based on the interactions with TC of those who've been far more involved with them than I, I would suggest that your suspicions of TC are correct. They act far less as a regulatory body, and far more of a lobbyist for the freight railway industry than they have any right to.

Dan

I’m not sure about the motives, because in this case, the disentangling of passenger and freight operations would work in favour of the freight railroads. I would rather suspect a complete aversion towards taking any risks, combined with the complete absence of any vision which would see passenger rail become a more relevant intercity transport mode...

 

[crs1026]

I’m not sure about the motives, because in this case, the disentangling of passenger and freight operations would work in favour of the freight railroads. I would rather suspect a complete aversion towards taking any risks, combined with the complete absence of any vision which would see passenger rail become a more relevant intercity transport mode...

Add to that the need to justify the existence and continued employment of a certain number of non-productive government employees, along with ensuring that VIA not embarass said government workers by actually succeeding when they have maintained all along that isn’t possible.

- Paul

 

[kEiThZ]

And yes, the desires are always endless: continuous double-tracking would be an equally obvious and costly wish...

Curious about this one.

How much capability does double tracking add? Does it let them run trains faster or just boost frequencies? And what would the frequency at which double tracking is required?

Just your best amateur guess!

I'm curious how double tracking might compare over other investment options.

 

[smallspy]

Curious about this one.

How much capability does double tracking add? Does it let them run trains faster or just boost frequencies? And what would the frequency at which double tracking is required?

Just your best amateur guess!

I'm curious how double tracking might compare over other investment options.

Double tracking allows for more capacity than a single track with passing sidings. The general rule is that a double track line has substantially more than double the capacity of a single tracked one. Trains are now able to overtake each other at speed, or pass each other without having to stop and wait at sidings (or not pass at all, if there are none).

It doesn't allow for a speed increase per se, but having double track versus single track can allow for schedules to be tightened (and potentially shortened) as there is now no longer a need to account for waiting time for meets in the schedule.

Dan

 

[kEiThZ]

I guess what I'm looking for is an educated guess on quantity. If one track can handle 15 per day in each direction, what does two tracks get them and do they really need that? What's the level of traffic at which two tracks is needed?

And how much would it cost? I would guess $2-3 million per km. But I wonder if some of that were better spent on grade separation and straightening the corridors where needed. If the extra capacity isn't foreseen as needed soon after launch.