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Roads: Gardiner Expressway

Where does that 120,000 number come from? I don't see it anywhere in the presentation. The peak hour Gardiner East traffic volume is 5,200.

I can't find anything with 120,000 either so i did some checking, i found this pdf http://www1.toronto.ca/City Of Toro...Road safety/Files/pdf/24hourvolumemap2013.pdf from 2013 that says the usage is 67,362 per weekday.


Having done a few infrastructure and real estate financial models for various public entities, I can tell you that 100 years is a ludicrous time horizon. I've done a couple at 50 years and even that horizon is silly, because the inflation risk ends up swinging the numbers so much. Bridges are typically built for a 75-year life-cycle, but you're including probably 5 resurfacing in there. Our suggestion to clients is that 25-30 year planning horizons make the most sense.

Also, my brother tells me the reason they can't re-align the Gardiner along the railway tracks is that the turn would be too tight? I can only see that as being true if they figure they have to get the curve to go under the rail corridor. If it goes over the corridor, why on earth can't it curve and cross over, then dive under Eastern? Seems to me like this, like many studies including reports I've worked on, is "make the data tell me this".

From my overlay of the existing curve below, I don't see how you'd have any trouble with this alignment. It would also open up the edge of the river.

Did you read page 25 and 26 of the presentation? That route can't be done because there is a city stormwater facility and the ramp design speed wouldn't be safe.

how many acres is that $150 million coming from?

Remove alternative would provide 12 additional acres of new development land. (page 47)
 
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With the Sheppard Subway, the expectation was that the province would meet its goals for suburban growth centres, in this case Scarb Centre and NYCC. Obviously the province spectacularly failed to meet those goals. If those goals were met, the subway likely would have been successful.

The Sheppard subway was a giant overkill for the traffic being considered, even back-in-the-day. But Toronto is allergic to LRTs for reasons that only make sense to Torontonians.
 
I didn't say long term costs are garbage. I said 100-year estimates are garbage. The best, the absolute best you could estimate out to with any kind of accuracy is maybe 25-30 years. Even then I still put *far* more weight on the initial costs than the ongoing maintenance costs.

The problem with a 30 year life-cycle is that you're costing it while it's still basically new. The 30 year point is when maintenance becomes more significant. It's like how warranties are basically designed to end right before the device is going to fail.

If you're going to cost, at least go with a 50-60 year cycle. The Gardiner was completed 1966 and it'll be replaced in the next decade.

With the Sheppard Subway, the expectation was that the province would meet its goals for suburban growth centres, in this case Scarb Centre and NYCC. Obviously the province spectacularly failed to meet those goals. If those goals were met, the subway likely would have been successful.

I was making reference to those very growth projections that failed to materialize. Experts produced rosy pictures that met the province's vision of growth in suburban nodes. As complicated and involved as studies like that can be, they are only as good as their underlying assumptions.
 
The problem with a 30 year life-cycle is that you're costing it while it's still basically new. The 30 year point is when maintenance becomes more significant. It's like how warranties are basically designed to end right before the device is going to fail.

I'm not sure if 30 years is when that occurs but the point is valid. That's why I think the pricing decision should be made primarily on the upfront short-term costs. Everything else is practically hand waving.

On the Scarborough Subway vs LRT, the numbers talked about did not include a 100-year total of all operational and maintenance costs for either solution - I'm not sure why the gardiner analysis needs to include it.
 
What really bugs me is the comparisons. They look at traffic patterns assuming that a massive LRT system is built. If it isn't the slowdown is about 15 minutes, not 2 minutes. But then they look at cost and specifically exclude the same LRT proposal.

So instead of saying it's $900M for a rebuild vs $500M for a road it should be $900M for a rebuild vs $1.5b for a road + LRT

The numbers assume that the Queens Quay East LRT, Broadview streetcar extension, DRL and "GO service improvements" are in place by the year 2031, and those things are supposed to happen regardless of what alternative gets picked. These are all separate projects, so why should all that be selectively lumped into the cost of removing the Gardiner? Are you saying that with the hybrid option we don't need to build transit in the area, but if we tear it down we do need it? If anything, the money saved by not pursuing the hybrid option would be best spent toward actually paying for said streetcar lines.
 
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With the Sheppard Subway, the expectation was that the province would meet its goals for suburban growth centres, in this case Scarb Centre and NYCC. Obviously the province spectacularly failed to meet those goals. If those goals were met, the subway likely would have been successful.

But at the end of the day the goals were not met, and the experts were wrong. Very wrong. Naturally anyone who questioned the City’s findings back then would’ve been right.

However in this situation, it seems anyone questioning the findings pertaining to the Gardiner is insulted and labelled with childish terms like "car people". Or put in the same category as some anti-vaccine nutters. That’s not fair. Experts are routinely wrong, and Sheppard (and Toronto’s history in general) is a testament to that.

They were expecting 15,400 pphpd. That's way beyond the scope of LRT.

Exactly. The City majorly fudged the projections – and more than likely on purpose. Why? To achieve their desired result of getting a subway built. Had they given realistic expectations for Sheppard, or purposely lowballed projections (as they did for the DRL), then they would've gotten LRT. They didn’t want that, so they grossly inflated numbers 3x higher.

Same thing with the Vaughan Subway, the Markham Subway, the Scarboro Subway, Eglinton West – and just about every extension since 1954.
 
how many acres is that $150 million coming from?

Not sure, but I believe a picture of one of the boards said the remove option will allow an additional 12 acres of development over the hybrid option.

If anyone can figure out or find an average land value for East Bayfront/Keating, you can use the City property tax calculator to find out how much in taxes that would generate.
 
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They were expecting 15,400 pphpd. That's way beyond the scope of LRT.

Ottawa's LRT will be around 18,000 pphpd on opening day, projected to reach 24,000 pphpd by 2031. They could have easily built it as underground LRT until Don Mills and then gone surface beyond there. It's the operating environment that limits capacity far more than the technology.
 
Ottawa's LRT will be around 18,000 pphpd on opening day, projected to reach 24,000 pphpd by 2031. They could have easily built it as underground LRT until Don Mills and then gone surface beyond there. It's the operating environment that limits capacity far more than the technology.

I wasn't specifying vehicle type. I was talking about the in median LRT mode. Obviously LRVs can carry a lot more than 10,000 pphpd under the proper conditions.
 
But at the end of the day the goals were not met, and the experts were wrong. Very wrong. Naturally anyone who questioned the City’s findings back then would’ve been right.

The City majorly fudged the projections – and more than likely on purpose. Why? To achieve their desired result of getting a subway built. Had they given realistic expectations for Sheppard

Yeah I know this. I was just pointing out that the incorrect projections for the for the Sheppard Subway weren't necessarily the fault of the TTC. Back in the 1980s, the province wanted to shift development away from downtown, so they created a plan for suburban growth centres. The ridership projections for the Sheppard Subway were a function of the success of Ontario's plan for suburban growth centres. The failure of the Sheppard Subway is ultimately because those growth expectations set by the province were wildly wrong.


Exactly. The City majorly fudged the projections – and more than likely on purpose. Why? To achieve their desired result of getting a subway built. Had they given realistic expectations for Sheppard or purposely lowballed projections (as they did for the DRL), then they would've gotten LRT. They didn’t want that, so they grossly inflated numbers 3x higher.

These are some pretty serious accusations you're making. Do you have any proof that City staff fabricated the projections?

RE Relief Line: The ridership projections for the RL have remained remarkably consistent over the past three decades. In the 1980s, the projected that it would move only 11,000 pphpd in 2011. In 2013, the DTRES projected about 17,000 pphpd in 2031 (20 years later). This consistency does not indicate that City staff have been fabricating usage projections.
 
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The 2031 traffic model assumed a full build out of the Portlands and a spike in downtown population and employment.

We're talking about a planned 8 lane boulevard (not 6 lanes) with special traffic signal phasing and only six signalized intersections. And you're comparing that to a north-south route with many closely spaced intersections and a traffic signal system that probably wasn't re-timed for many years nor designed for high vehicle speeds. Please visit the recently rebuilt Hwy 7 East in Markham for a better comparison.

The current travel time is less than 90 seconds. The proposal suggests an additional 2-3 minutes with the tear down option. It sounds improbable at best, that a 2km trip through a densely populated area will take only 4 minutes to travel through at the height of rush hour. Any delays on the Gardiner WB before Yonge will cause back-ups on the DVP southbound. Wouldn't stop lights guarantee a back up of traffic?


As the study has said, development will happen with either of the two alternatives. But keeping the highway will maintain the unpleasant pedestrian environment and poor aesthetics that lowers the quality of life for waterfront residents. Why should the rail corridor be an excuse to further tarnish the waterfront with this thing:

17167227712_c6ded46348_o.png


I agree that it isn't pleasant to keep the Gardiner beside the Channel. I don't fully appreciate how the First Gulf Hybrid proposal was eliminated on technical grounds. Surely there must be a way to build a bridge along-side the rail lines and not compromise safety. Eliminating the proposal does one thing: as you point out, it makes the remove the Gardiner option look more attractive from an aesthetics and quality of life POV.

I agree with other comments on this thread, keep the connection between the DVP and Gardiner at 2 lanes each direction and funnel the Westbound traffic from Lakeshore onto the Gardiner at Jarvis. The section of Gardiner that would be rebuilt would extend from Cherry to the DVP. All other sections would be brought down.
 
Did you read page 25 and 26 of the presentation? That route can't be done because there is a city stormwater facility and the ramp design speed wouldn't be safe.

The ramp speed wouldn't be any different than what exists if the ramp touches down close to Eastern, if anything it could be shallower with realignment.

As for the stormwater facility, that is an un-designed project at this time. I don't see how building the land-side of a storm-water facility (it's actually a sediment trap facility) under a realigned Gardiner could be less plausible than "utilize existing DVP ramps" as shown in Slide 39, when their overlay clearly shows that half of those existing ramp supports would be in the middle of the expanded river mouth (ie. would have to be rebuilt in the riverbed). The Lower Donlands Framework Plan (here) shows more detail of what they are claiming would interfere...it just doesn't sound right.
 
The ramp speed wouldn't be any different than what exists if the ramp touches down close to Eastern, if anything it could be shallower with realignment.

As for the stormwater facility, that is an un-designed project at this time. I don't see how building the land-side of a storm-water facility (it's actually a sediment trap facility) under a realigned Gardiner could be less plausible than "utilize existing DVP ramps" as shown in Slide 39, when their overlay clearly shows that half of those existing ramp supports would be in the middle of the expanded river mouth (ie. would have to be rebuilt in the riverbed). The Lower Donlands Framework Plan (here) shows more detail of what they are claiming would interfere...it just doesn't sound right.

Ohhh, so the stormwater facility isn't actually built yet...or designed. I thought I was crazy not being able to spot it on google maps.
 

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