picard102
Senior Member
Would love to know how much these EV's will cost consumers here, and what data protections we'll have.
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PM Mark Carney's Canada
- Thread starter Richard White
- Start date
Admiral Beez
Superstar
What Canada (and the USA) needs is a digital privacy law with default opt-outs. We do have PIPEDA (Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act), which is a start. Also under Quebec provincial law, default tracking is illegal without explicit opt-in.
But really, if the Europeans and Australians can embrace Chinese EVs, so can we. I'll take a MG Cyberster please!
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urbanclient
Active Member
"We take the world as it is, not as we wish it to be." An explicit confirmation of Realpolitik right there. National interest over abstract ideological differences.
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lenaitch
Senior Member
"cheap made-in-China electric vehicles"
I'm old enough to remember when they said the same thing about Japanese vehicles when they first started entering the market in the 1960s. In some ways, they were, but they endured and improved. We have a competitive market. Data security concerns aside, so long as they meet Canadian motor vehicle safety standards, their impact on the market will depending on their quality, price point and support network.
Mihairokov
Senior Member
Said the same thing when Daewoo/KIA/Hyundai entered here 25 years ago and now they're equivalent or better to anything else. Chinese cars are head-and-shoulders ahead of where Korean cars were when they entered our market. And they'll still be cheaper. Ford is carrying water for American corporations.
My mom has a new Volkswagen and I was out driving it a few days ago and when I got home she asked how X place was when I went. "How'd you know that?" "Oh, the car has an app where I can check its location at any time". I know people have raised these data privacy concerns with domestic vehicles but if China or anyone else wanted traffic data they could simply use Google or any of our ATIP-abble data which is publicly available. If China wants to know that I go to Dollarama maybe they can update the pricing at PopMart. What are Americans gleaning from every Ford or Chevy on our roads?
afransen
Senior Member
Tesla is now sourcing Model Y (their main seller) from their Berlin factory for the Canadian market.
We might see some vehicles from China in Canada. It's possible they switch Model Y back to China, or maybe just some of the variants that are produced in China (their 7 seater long wheelbase Model Y L).
I expect we'll see some BYD and Xioamis enter the market as well.
afransen
Senior Member
25% is not realistic, absent major trade barriers. Canada trade with the US is akin to UK trade with the EU, not with the US.
Admiral Beez
Superstar
The EV deal requires that at least half of the new cars from China would retail for less than CAD $35k. That cancels out Teslas for at least half.
afransen
Senior Member
There is no such requirement. It is import price (wholesale) and just 'anticipated'.
lenaitch
Senior Member
Agree. We owned a Pony back in the '80s (ya . . . I know). I remember looking under the hood and thinking it looked familiar with cars I cut my teeth on in the '60s, and later read how Korea reverse engineered and copied what they could from all the military vehicles left behind after the war.
Full Metal Junkie
Active Member
Here is a 2023 Mozilla report about the types of data the biggest global car brands are already collecting (it's bad):
*Privacy Not Included: A Buyer’s Guide for Connected Products
All 25 car brands we researched earned our *Privacy Not Included warning label – making cars the worst category of products that we have ever reviewed
www.mozillafoundation.org
Here's the YouTube video on the topic (oversensationalized, yet on point):
The Chinese vehicles will be no different. They will spy on you. But driving the Chinese brands will most likely have less adverse shot term effects on your insurance premiums than if you drove an established car brand.
guavadelic
Active Member
Americans in border states when they see Chinese EVs for the first time....
hw621
Senior Member
The entry of Chinese electric vehicle manufacturers into the Canadian market presents a challenge that goes far beyond vehicle quality, technological advancement or privacy protection. Canada’s automotive sector is not simply encountering new competitors; it is being exposed to a fundamentally different industrial model that operates on an entirely uneven playing field. Chinese EV manufacturers benefit from a combination of weak labour protections, limited social welfare obligations, and extensive state support, including heavy government subsidies that materially distort costs and pricing. These structural advantages are incompatible with the regulatory, labour, and market frameworks governing Canada’s automotive industry.
A recent and instructive example is the lawsuit involving BYD’s operations in Brazil. Brazilian labour authorities have alleged that Chinese)p workers connected to a BYD project were subjected to conditions deemed analogous to forced labour, including overcrowded and unsanitary housing, excessive working hours, unlawful wage deductions, and restrictions on personal freedom. Particularly revealing were reports that some workers expressed surprise at being “rescued” by authorities, as the conditions—despite clearly violating Brazilian law—were still meaningfully better than those they had previously endured in similar work environments in China. This reaction highlights how deeply minimal labour protections are normalized within parts of the Chinese manufacturing system and how this normalization feeds directly into cost competitiveness abroad.
This labour asymmetry is further compounded by extraordinary levels of government intervention. Chinese EV manufacturers benefit from direct subsidies, preferential financing from state-owned banks, discounted or free land, tax holidays, subsidized energy, and coordinated industrial policies designed to accelerate global market dominance. These supports are not isolated incentives but part of a comprehensive state-led strategy that shields firms from market risk and enables sustained losses or aggressive pricing in foreign markets. Such practices have no parallel in the Japanese or Korean automotive sectors, where manufacturers operate within market-based systems and are subject to strict labour, environmental, and competition regulations.
For Canada, the implications are stark. The domestic automotive industry is being asked to compete not only against lower labour standards but also against state-subsidized pricing that no private, rules-based market can reasonably match. Left unaddressed, this dynamic forces a binary outcome: either Canada compromises its labour standards, industrial policies, and social protections to chase artificially depressed prices, or it allows subsidized imports to flood the market, hollowing out domestic manufacturing, supplier networks, and skilled employment.
Beyond the immediate economic impact lies a broader strategic risk. Market penetration by Chinese EV manufacturers will almost certainly be portrayed through state-aligned narratives as evidence of technological superiority and systemic effectiveness, rather than as the result of labour arbitrage and heavy state subsidization. This messaging will spill into other sectors, shaping public perceptions and policy debates well beyond automotive manufacturing. In this context, the issue is not simply whether Chinese EVs can compete in Canada, but whether Canada is prepared to defend fair competition, labour protections, and industrial sovereignty against an industrial model explicitly designed to undercut them.
A recent and instructive example is the lawsuit involving BYD’s operations in Brazil. Brazilian labour authorities have alleged that Chinese)p workers connected to a BYD project were subjected to conditions deemed analogous to forced labour, including overcrowded and unsanitary housing, excessive working hours, unlawful wage deductions, and restrictions on personal freedom. Particularly revealing were reports that some workers expressed surprise at being “rescued” by authorities, as the conditions—despite clearly violating Brazilian law—were still meaningfully better than those they had previously endured in similar work environments in China. This reaction highlights how deeply minimal labour protections are normalized within parts of the Chinese manufacturing system and how this normalization feeds directly into cost competitiveness abroad.
This labour asymmetry is further compounded by extraordinary levels of government intervention. Chinese EV manufacturers benefit from direct subsidies, preferential financing from state-owned banks, discounted or free land, tax holidays, subsidized energy, and coordinated industrial policies designed to accelerate global market dominance. These supports are not isolated incentives but part of a comprehensive state-led strategy that shields firms from market risk and enables sustained losses or aggressive pricing in foreign markets. Such practices have no parallel in the Japanese or Korean automotive sectors, where manufacturers operate within market-based systems and are subject to strict labour, environmental, and competition regulations.
For Canada, the implications are stark. The domestic automotive industry is being asked to compete not only against lower labour standards but also against state-subsidized pricing that no private, rules-based market can reasonably match. Left unaddressed, this dynamic forces a binary outcome: either Canada compromises its labour standards, industrial policies, and social protections to chase artificially depressed prices, or it allows subsidized imports to flood the market, hollowing out domestic manufacturing, supplier networks, and skilled employment.
Beyond the immediate economic impact lies a broader strategic risk. Market penetration by Chinese EV manufacturers will almost certainly be portrayed through state-aligned narratives as evidence of technological superiority and systemic effectiveness, rather than as the result of labour arbitrage and heavy state subsidization. This messaging will spill into other sectors, shaping public perceptions and policy debates well beyond automotive manufacturing. In this context, the issue is not simply whether Chinese EVs can compete in Canada, but whether Canada is prepared to defend fair competition, labour protections, and industrial sovereignty against an industrial model explicitly designed to undercut them.