GO is using a relatively smaller portion of their network where an excess of capacity already exists. GO's trains run slower, and thus interface with the freight schedules better. VIA uses a far bigger portion of their network, and trying to weave their trains between the freights reeks havok on their own runs.
Come on, we know the same guys. We know what they say about the VIA's. Have you ever heard them say the same in the same quantities about the GO's?
We're saying the same thing, I just said it inside out. Why is CN so recalcitrant about GO Halwest-Silver when they are "happy" (a relative term) to handle VIA to the extent that they are Toronto-Montreal? It certainly isn't about dispatching or track capacity, CN has more of that on the halton than they did pre-GO.
That's true, and to be honest it's something I can't account for beyond simple word of mouth. But the feeling at VIA's head office is that they are still getting taken for a ride by CN.
I think the times have changed on this one, and VIA needs to face that. The current VIA formula (whatever it is) is supposedly still somewhat based on the theory that VIA/GO is only using excess capacity so only needs to pay for is avoidable costs, ie anything that will still be there if VIA leaves is CN's cost.
Between Toronto-Brockville, VIA's use of CN's assets is now so intensive that CN has every right to ask why their capital is used in this way. As I have commented before, if VIA came off the Kingston Sub in entirety, CN would likely look closely at the economics of single tracking some of it. They have capital tied up that VIA uses, but CN doesn't need.
VIA may feel it is overcharged for value received, but CN probably feels it is just using creative accounting to reach a fairer formula. Operationally, "those guys" tell me they leave the super-long freights on the straight track and weave the VIA's around them. The VIA guys say they are constantly the ones facing the delays, because each slowdown for a crossover costs a few minutes. They are correct. Again, that speaks to just how many VIA's there are out there these days.
I have a feeling that the Halwest-Silver issue is only about the money. CN may have felt that this is the right time to stand its ground. And they may feel that GO has "moved into the basement" - ie now treats the line as their own, expecting to make intensive use of it, whereas on a CN-invested vs GO-invested basis CN is still the majority partner.
It may be time for a new formula (or maybe it's already there, we just don't know it) that accounts for the capital that each party is investing in the line and allocates cost and reward accordingly. That kind of "partnership" formula will be hotly opposed by CN/CP, even if it's better financially than today - because, fundamentally, they own the line and want to do as they please.
I remember that report, and I remember the original announcement. Do you also remember how vague it was about what was going to be built? I also remember the follow-up announcement when the shovels were about to hit the ground - I still have a copy of it somewhere - and the follow-up was a lot more specific on details and a less generous about what was going to be possible for the money. And to be honest, they didn't even meet the follow-up, but they were also a hell of a lot closer to what actually happened.
Somewhere I have the track maps from the 'eventual' announcement. The original announcement was political and as usual promised the stars and the moon. The 'eventual' was pretty specific.
What I recall those "same guys we know" saying is that VIA was in over its head from day one. VIA had no real expertise in construction project planning or execution, and the government wanted quick impact. So they rushed the work ahead without doing sufficient engineering design and without fully understanding field conditions. VIA had little experience in managing contractors (who in turn used subcontractors). That is a recipe for disaster in any infrastructure project. Sure enough, the contractor went ahead (as VIA asked them to), ran into problems, and VIA did not have the project management expertise to pull the contractor or subs back before a lot of money got burned with nothing to show for it.
I recall people at the time saying how little was getting done in the field and how the contractor was still out there long after the schedule said the work would be finished.
The A-G seems to have confirmed what our guys were saying all along.
And that doesn't change the fact that ONTC did themselves no favours. You don't continue to maintain jointed rail laid 70 years ago to allow you to run at 60mph or more when you can replace it with CWR and cut your maintenance requirements by half or more. You don't continue to run trains with staffing arrangements that were seemingly created in the 1950s simply because "that's how we've always done it". You can't operate a maintenance division for outside work and then continue to lose money on the contracts that you win.
People who look at the Northlander in isolation don't appreciate the big picture. ONTC was an old-style Ontario Government agency, founded to deliver economic development to the North. It was run just like the old Ontario Hydro (and other government agencies of the day - MTO, LCBO, etc etc) . Big unions, programmatic management as opposed to bottom line management, employment and labour compensation hugely over labour market conditions. There was a day when public sector wages were intended to deliver signals to private enterprise, now not so. (ONTC's pension plan deficit was a huge concern.... had the same money that was put into shoring up the pension plan been put into economic development up north, we would have a bunch of stuff going on up there!)..
Ontario has successfully moved away from this model in other places, but thanks to politics ONTC has fought a lot of this off - folks up there are still in denial today. The passenger train is just one little skirmish in all that.
- Paul
