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GO Transit Fleet Equipment and other

Proper signaling, backup systems, crew training, anti collision devices, automated PTC all are much better at saving lives than fortifying trains to be as hard as tanks.

You don't have to design trains to survive a high speed crash if you do everything you can to prevent the crash from happening in the first place.
 
Proper signaling, backup systems, crew training, anti collision devices, automated PTC all are much better at saving lives than fortifying trains to be as hard as tanks.

You don't have to design trains to survive a high speed crash if you do everything you can to prevent the crash from happening in the first place.

That may be the case, but you still need to have some crashworthiness - even all of those other systems aren't foolproof, as we have seen time and time and time again.

And in any case, until Transport Canada decrees otherwise, the rules need to be followed.

Dan
Toronto, Ont.
 
Proper signaling, backup systems, crew training, anti collision devices, automated PTC all are much better at saving lives than fortifying trains to be as hard as tanks.

You don't have to design trains to survive a high speed crash if you do everything you can to prevent the crash from happening in the first place.

A head on crash may be an unfair test of the crash worthiness of the vehhicle, but it needs to have sufficient integrity for grade crossing mishaps, picked switches, and other derailments - all of which may involve telescoping or frontal collisions with structures.

- Paul
 
Obviously my statements weren't to imply that I think trains should be built out of cardboard and paper mache...
 
Obviously my statements weren't to imply that I think trains should be built out of cardboard and paper mache...

I didn't take them that way. It would be good to know exactly what the difference is - expressed in some meaningful manner similar to auto bumper standards. A Euro model can collide with a static barrier at x km/h without crumpling, vs a Canadian model at y km/h.

People will get thrown about in any event, which makes a rigid carbody moot in some scenarios. The issue is more where one car rides up over the frame of the next car and slices into it. Or where a car disintegrates versus plowing through an obstruction while remaining intact, with survivable deceleration.

The prevalence of grade crossings, as opposed to the potential impact into a freight train, is (to me) what justifies having North American standards, especially relative to Europe (yes, I know they have a few, but not nearly as many). EMU vs gravel truck or low-rider flatbed trailer is the scenario we need to fear most. Does a Euro standard offer equal protection in these?

- Paul
 
Does a Euro standard offer equal protection in these?

- Paul
The question is, *which* North Am standards? FRA? APTA? Other? Some European standards are tougher, some not, depending on a number of factors. Couplers are usually of a higher standard for passenger, and coaches much less likely to tip when accordianing. Suffice to say the FRA is offering more waivers than they have in the past, much more for passenger. "Crashworthiness" takes on a whole new meaning when there are no grade crossings, roads or tracks.

Thirteen years dated, but still of great concern with "Push-Pull" type consists (I'm sure there's been more studies since, suffice to say 'double ended locomotives are consider safer) which grow ever more popular:
Rail Study: Pushed as Safe as Pulled
The differences are so small, researchers say, that expensive new measures or banning rear-engine passenger trains aren't justified.
July 15, 2005|Dan Weikel | Times Staff Writer


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A new federal study triggered by January's deadly Metrolink crash in Glendale shows there is little difference in safety between commuter trains pulled by locomotives and those pushed by engines from the rear.

The interim report by the Federal Railroad Administration states that push operations have slightly higher rates of derailment and fatalities.

But the researchers say the differences are so narrow that they don't justify expensive safety measures or eliminating push operations, a widespread practice in commuter rail.

"There are quite a few chances and very few derailments" in both cases, said Grady Cothen, a high-ranking safety administrator at the agency. Nevertheless, "we are continually working to improve safety and to reduce risk in the operating environment."

However, the study does state that when a crash occurs at a crossing or with another train, passengers in trains pushed by locomotives may be more vulnerable than people riding in cars behind an engine.

In push mode, a train is controlled from a cab car, a passenger coach at the front of the train with an engineer's station. The practice has come under intense scrutiny since the Glendale crash, which killed 11 people and injured 180 others Jan. 26.

That morning a Metrolink train with a cab car in front struck a sport utility vehicle and derailed. Its jackknifing cars hit a parked freight locomotive and another Metrolink train. In May, Juan Manuel Alvarez, 26, of Compton was ordered to stand trial on murder charges after he allegedly drove his SUV onto the tracks and triggered the wreck.

Some railroad experts say cab cars have a higher chance of derailing in a wreck and leave passengers more at risk in frontal crashes compared with trains pulled by heavier locomotives.

In the wake of the Glendale crash, Metrolink passengers and their relatives have sued the line, alleging that cab cars are unsafe. A group of rail commuters, led by the widow of Tom Ormiston, a conductor killed in the crash, is also conducting a petition drive demanding that Metrolink end push operations.

Rail officials counter that cab cars have provided millions of miles of accident-free travel since Metrolink began operations in 1992. The new federal report, they say, supports their contentions that push operations are safe.

"The statistics show there is a very small risk of an accident with a cab car," said David Solow, Metrolink's chief executive. "That doesn't mean we should not continue to work on crash avoidance."

Metrolink has had four major accidents in its history involving cab cars, including the Glendale crash; 15 passengers have been killed and more than 330 injured. In the two major crashes related to trains pulled by locomotives, 25 people were hurt, and no one was killed.

In their study, the researchers considered 446 crashes between commuter trains and motor vehicles at grade crossings from January 1997 to February 2005. Of 263 accidents involving trains pulled by locomotives, there was one derailment. Out of 183 collisions involving the push mode, two trains derailed.

There were no deaths and two injuries involving the derailment of the pull operation. There were 22 injuries and one death involving the push mode, all from a single Metrolink accident in Burbank in 2003.

The fatality rate for commuter rail services was 0.552 per billion passenger miles for push operations and 0.136 for pull operations, according researchers. If the Glendale crash is excluded, the rate drops to 0.184. In comparison, the fatality rate for automobiles is 8.283.

Researchers noted that over the study period, commuter trains traveled more than 374 million miles and made more than 3.4 billion passenger trips. Given the high mileage, researchers said, accident rates for all commuter service were extremely low.

Considering commuter rail and the Glendale accident, the study concluded that the chance of a push-mode train derailing in a grade-crossing collision was only 1.5% higher than a pull operation.

The difference, researchers said, "was not statistically significant."

The study cautioned that because the actual number of accidents was very low, there was not enough information to determine whether the pull mode was safer than the push mode. One serious accident, they said, could change the picture dramatically for either mode.
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jul/15/local/me-railstudy15

In light of new technologies and much newer stats and research, it's time to re-visit antiquated 'regulations', as had to happen with aircraft. Protectionism is a very poor excuse for interfering with progress.
 
The prevalence of grade crossings, as opposed to the potential impact into a freight train, is (to me) what justifies having North American standards, especially relative to Europe (yes, I know they have a few, but not nearly as many). EMU vs gravel truck or low-rider flatbed trailer is the scenario we need to fear most.
The various EMU trains are governed by many European standards (list of regulatory bodies)

In the other thread, and in RER business case (Option 5 Optimized) revenue service EMUs would run only to Bramalea/Aurora/Unionville (not Lakeshore) so the Waiver would only apply to a subset of GO's owned network.

It was suggested freight becomes temporally separated (e.g. nighttime customer service) on those sections, and that the ongoing grade separations mostly finishes them along these sections at least. This brings the corridor to a par similar (or better) than the Caltrain waiver.

The question was, are the timelines realistic enough for Transport Canada to do a waiver?
(Section 5.2, Page 134, RER Business Case is an additional place where lighter strength is being evaluated as a possibility, depending on Transport Canada outcome)
 
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I'm not convinced that GO should move away from the current crash safety standard.
I think you miss the real concern of "accordianing" as opposed to "crumple" from the safety aspect.

Let me put it this way, (and I have posted a research paper in these forums a week or so back, somewhat questionable, but by the FRA, discounting the danger of "push-pull")...so you have a one of the heaviest diesel locos made in North Am, the MP54C, pushing a string of 12 coaches in front that impacts a stalled truck on the tracks.

By your logic, what will happen to those coaches in front of the loco?

Meantime, here's another Youtube Vid to consider on what the one you posted is all about:

European crash standards have proven to be even superior to FRA ones in some respects.
 
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I don't see the problem. If there's no locomotive in front, then they are even safer.
lol...ever wonder why Amtrak or VIA don't run them that way? How about those very regs you tout prevent it?

Meantime, in the RoW:
CAF in the world
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Push-pull trains and passenger cars
Our range of push-pull trains and passenger cars offers the utmost in comfort and functionality based on the services required.

The Push-Pull trains developed by CAF, such as those supplied to Saudi Arabia, feature the very latest in safety technology whilst fulfilling the most exacting interior design specifications.

The flexibility of our products allows us to offer trains with sections of many different types, based on the customer's specific requirements: areas for families, children, prayers; areas specially designed for persons with reduced mobility; restaurant cars; and vehicle carriers, amongst others.

CAF offers a wide range of passenger cars, including:

  • High comfort saloon and compartment cars.
  • Couchettes and sleeping cars.
  • Restaurant and cafeteria cars.
  • Luggage vans.
The latest Push-Pull units can reach speeds of more than 200 kilometres an hour.
http://www.caf.net/en/productos-servicios/proyectos/proyecto-regionales-coche.php

But these don't meet the FRA regs you tout. Why not?
 
I'm not convinced that GO should move away from the current crash safety standard.
Locomotives are dense and create the most collision damage risk. It's theoretically possible locomotives may have enforced temporal separation on the track wherever EMUs run.

Let's also consider relative masses -- a FRA-rated GO rear cab versus a locomotive or heavy freight train car (e.g. gravel bucket!) -- can be less safe than an European EMU versus another European EMU even in a non-CBTC environment. There are many variables at play here, and one of the many possible changes to operating rules is temporal separation away from dense railcars/locomotives that is automatically enforced by a train control system that automatically brakes on proximity (e.g. PTC, CBTC, etc). Essentially, the train equivalent of a Cessna shouldn't closely trail an Airbus A380 on landing approach.

In ten years (ish) or twenty -- the operating rules for lighter structural strength needs to also consider the potential flexibility afforded by CBTC (Communications Based Train Control) which is what Metrolinx wants to deploy for GO RER. Having CBTC-enforced extra temporal separation (extra distance between light and heavy trains or locomotives) between EMUs and classic GO BiLevels, especially when an EMU is chasing a pusher locomotive.

Metrolinx has allotted $800 million dollars of the $13.5bn GO RER electrification budget, to this train control system that will also be able to automatically control temporal separation between different types of trains.

Also, there are structural safety improvements that can also be done in other ways too. EMUs are often tightly coupled with each other, often keeping the train from accordianing sideways and crumpling against things like bridge pillars and killing more people -- in one case, this design (despire EMU being lighter than FRA structural strength) -- the tight coupling between coaches -- apparently saved a lot of lives when a derailed EMU slid/scraped past bridge pillars instead of accordianing/jacknifing 90 degrees and then wrapping around bridge pillars and instantly killing more people. (Trying to find the incident, I'll post later).

The CBTC systems can automatically brake the EMU if it gets too close. Enforced temporal separation between EMUs can be less than enforced temporal separation between EMU and BiLevels (big, but still possible to interleave throughout the day) which can be conversely less than temporal separation between EMUs and freight trains (big enough to force freight customer servicing to nighttime)

Enforced temporal separation with freight would be even bigger forcing freight customer service to primarly run at nighttime on the section of the system wherever revenue-service EMU runs (Bramalea/Aurora/Stoufville). These are also the most-grade seperated sections of the GO network, and might even become fully grade separated wherever EMU carries passengers, as that type of train is planned only for a subset of the GO network.

Obviously, there will need to be time for the CBTC systems to mature, but it is starting to have widespread deployments throughout the world as we speak -- it's exactly the same type of system TTC is installing on Yonge to shorten headways between trains, and predecessors to CBTC are already in widespread use in Europe/Japan (various enhanced variants of Positive Train Control / Automatic Train Control). CBTC systems are already deployed near us today, including in places like Ottawa's LRT lines. In ~10 years, CBTC will be far more reliable and mature, when electrified GO RER starts.

The newer versions of the same type of systems also have the capability to intelligently assign different temporal separation distances to different types of trains (heavier and lighter trains), giving freight trains huge separation (forcing to night), and BiLevels a wider berth than EMUs (forcing more lull before/after a heavy-locomotive-driven BiLevel, and a lightweight EMU).
 
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Locomotives are dense and create the most collision damage risk. It's theoretically possible locomotives may have enforced temporal separation on the track wherever EMUs run....

The CBTC systems can automatically brake the EMU if it gets too close. Enforced temporal separation between EMUs can be less than enforced temporal separation between EMU and BiLevels (big, but still possible to interleave throughout the day) which can be conversely less than temporal separation between EMUs and freight trains (big enough to force freight customer servicing to nighttime)...
Obviously, there will need to be time for the CBTC systems to mature, but it is starting to have widespread deployments throughout the world as we speak -- it's exactly the same system TTC is installing on Yonge to shorten headways between trains, and predecessors to CBTC are already in widespread use in Europe/Japan.

The newer versions of the same type of systems also have the capability to intelligently assign different temporal separation distances to different types of trains (heavier and lighter trains), giving freight trains huge separation (forcing to night), and BiLevels a wider berth than EMUs (forcing more lull before/after a heavy-locomotive-driven BiLevel, and a lightweight EMU).
Indeed, and the debate of weight over crashworthiness continues:
[...]
In the four previous years, there had been two other derailments of Metrolink push trains, resulting in fatalities in Burbank and in Placentia.

"The mass of a cab car, even if beefed up, is not the same as a locomotive," railroad safety expert William Keppen told the Los Angeles Times. "You just don't get the same level of protection, and the number of cars that were to derail would probably be fewer."

The FRA report did not recommend limiting use of the push configuration.

"FRA recommends continued emphasis on progressive improvement of passenger rail safety as a whole, rather than abandonment of push-pull service," concluded the report, signed by then-Administrator Joseph Boardman. The agency's position has not changed.

At the time the report was issued in 2006, one-third of all commuter train miles were traveled in push mode, one-third in pull mode, and the other third covered by another configuration in which the lead car is a passenger cabin with locomotive.

The 2006 report discussed different strategies to increase push operation safety, including keeping passengers out of the lead cab car when feasible, and also leading with a so-called "cabbage car" -- a locomotive with engine removed, making it a cab car with room for baggage.

Amtrak, among other rail operators, has used cabbage cars on push trains for some of its routes.

Pfiester is convinced it would have made a difference in Oxnard, where the Metrolink struck an abandoned Ford pickup truck with trailer.

"Had there been a cabbage car, it would have knocked the truck out of the way," Pfiester said.

Another advantage of the cabbage car is that, unlike a locomotive, it carries no fuel that could catch fire in front of passengers in a collision.

The FRA report listed some drawbacks of cabbage cars, including limited supply. Their weight is also a double-edged sword — potentially helpful in a push mode collision, but in pull mode, more likely to cause a train to "buckle."

Apart from collisions, the added weight slows acceleration and increases braking distance, the report noted.

Metrolink's Lustgarten declined to speculate on alternative scenarios in Oxnard, but dismissed the idea of adding cabbage cars.

"We really don't think it's necessary," he said.

Lustgarten emphasized that Metrolink has committed hundreds of millions of dollars in recent years to safety upgrades, and since 2010 has already replaced two-thirds of its passenger cars and all of its cab cars with new generation models designed to be more crash-resistant.

The cars, built by South Korea's Hyundai Rotem, include stronger passenger compartments shielded by crush zones to absorb the energy of impacts.

Inside passenger seats have higher backs and work tables are "frangible" to absorb impact.

Metrolink believes the new cars helped prevent more serious injuries in Oxnard.

Next week, Metrolink will begin testing "positive train control" on its San Bernardino line. PTC is intended to intervene in cases where the engineer may becomes incapacitated, or when an error has resulted in two trains approaching on the same track.

But the issue of pull mode safety improvements could resurface in another federal report in the aftermath of the Oxnard derailment.

The National Transportation Safety Board chose to send a team to investigate the accident. NTSB reports seek not only to determine the cause, but also to determine where safety may be improved.
http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/l...er-Oxnard-Metrolink-Derailment-294479371.html[/quote]
 

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