Exactly. We are all recognizing that even with HFR we are counting on use of shared freight lines, possibly for 20-30 more years. It is inevitable that, whatever CN can accommodate in the short term, the trend is that they will gradually grow their business, and as that happens they will quite rightly want their capacity returned to them for their own use. Absent some intervention, VIA will be encouraged to prune its service.
That’s why the assurances that “service will be fine, don’t worry! “ isn’t washing. Skipping ahead a few chapters, the picture isn’t rosy.
The question is whether Ottawa just shrugs lets that happen, or recognises the inevitable and acts proactively to mitigate it. We can’t accelerate thirty years of railway building, but we can secure enforceable and transparent provisions that give VIA sufficient capacity and reliability for the next decades. That will come at a fair cost, I’m sure, I’m not suggesting CN provide a freebie.
The A-G report that criticised the failed 2008-2009 tracklaying project
documents VIA’s business case for that expansion. It lays out what VIA was trying to buy (160 miles of track, of which only 70 km got built) and what that would give them (a certain number of train slots at a certain trip time - which btw compares favourably with HFR). (And BTW, one can’t deny that In effect, it is a business case for a reworked VIA Fast flavoured expansion). I give VIA credit for preparing that BCA just as competently, and just as thoroughly, as the work that got HFR going. The project failed, mostly due to the particular commercial relationship between VIA and CN, and due to VIA’s lack of project management capability. That failure does not imply the plan was unrealistic. Even at the final cost per mile, the cancelled work is not unaffordable. I trust those VIA-generated numbers.
It’s understandable why the government of that day did not throw good money after bad to finish the plan as a cost overrun: they were looking for a braggable political win, and the failure to manage cost deprived them of that. The realisation that shared use is unsustainable was a painful lesson learned, and HFR is the result. But - where shared use can’t be eliminated quickly - correct the execution flaws, improve CN’s accountability (with greater upside, perhaps).... the 90 km of unlaid track is not unaffordable as a bridge to a non-shared 2nd tier line some day.
- Paul