Allandale25
Senior Member
Try your MPP as one option.
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Metrolinx: Other Items (catch all)
- Thread starter TheTigerMaster
- Start date
Allandale25
Senior Member
Not sure if it has been mentioned here already, but I've noticed that Metrolinx is closing all of its per project (i.e., Hamilton LRT and GO Expansion) and transitioning to a per region model (i.e., Metrolinx Toronto, Metrolinx Peel).
Northern Light
Superstar
This could go in the GO service thread, or here, I'll plunk it here:
www.thestar.com
Long and short, there was an 'incident' on January 5th that involved a near derailment of a GO Train at speed, near Oakville Stn.
The trail blew through a stop signal at 112 km/ph and then through a switch, changing tracks, at that speed, whereas the switch was rated for 24km/ph.
Excerpts of the article follow:
Gareth Dennis, a UK-based railway engineer w/Mx experience is quoted:
In the piece we find:
1) A internal report from Mx was due within 60-75 days, said report has not been published or made public.
2) The Federal Transportation Safety Board is not investigating
3) Alstom declined to comment. Mx offered the usual fluff.
***
Also discussed, a past committing to delivering modern Train Protection systems such as ECTS, but that they are not in place and that no timeline for delivery has been announced.
and
That the TSB is concerned about regulatory oversight of GO. From a 2023 Report:
****
Overall, an excellent, insightful piece from @atakagi1 I highly commend it.
@crs1026
@smallspy
GO train near Oakville was seconds away from ‘worst-case’ derailment, internal Metrolinx report shows
Experts raise concerns about the GO network’s safety infrastructure and Metrolinx’s transparency.
www.thestar.com
Long and short, there was an 'incident' on January 5th that involved a near derailment of a GO Train at speed, near Oakville Stn.
The trail blew through a stop signal at 112 km/ph and then through a switch, changing tracks, at that speed, whereas the switch was rated for 24km/ph.
Excerpts of the article follow:
Gareth Dennis, a UK-based railway engineer w/Mx experience is quoted:
In the piece we find:
1) A internal report from Mx was due within 60-75 days, said report has not been published or made public.
2) The Federal Transportation Safety Board is not investigating
3) Alstom declined to comment. Mx offered the usual fluff.
***
Also discussed, a past committing to delivering modern Train Protection systems such as ECTS, but that they are not in place and that no timeline for delivery has been announced.
and
That the TSB is concerned about regulatory oversight of GO. From a 2023 Report:
****
Overall, an excellent, insightful piece from @atakagi1 I highly commend it.
@crs1026
@smallspy
ShonTron
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Classic Metrolinx transparency:
“ According to the Metrolinx report, an internal investigation would be completed within 60 to 75 days of the incident. But no report has so far been made public and there is no indication from the provincial transit agency that it will be.”
“ According to the Metrolinx report, an internal investigation would be completed within 60 to 75 days of the incident. But no report has so far been made public and there is no indication from the provincial transit agency that it will be.”
crs1026
Superstar
One interesting detail I noted was the use of the term "signal passed at danger" which is UK terminology.
In North America the term would be "movement exceeds limits of authority" or more specifically a violation of CROR Rule 439 (which defines a 'stop' signal)
For context, one can find data here
https://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/stats/rail/2024/sser-ssro-2024.html#tsb-common-toc-57hlu64omqp-item-4 (frustrating failure of my tablet word processor rhat won't let me embed the link, sorry)
on how often this is happening in Canada. ML data will not appear in this tabulation because ML is not required to report incidents to Ottawa. The fact that similar data is not made public at provincial level is indeed a serious failure in public transparency.
Without knowing the details of this incident (which we should not prejudge) one can be fairly certain that a train which reached a stop signal at the reported 112 km/h should have already passed one or more ""approach" signals which would have indicated a need to slow down and prepare to stop.
The reality is, in Canada "limits to authority" in signalled territory are managed by human beings reading and interpreting the colour and indication of visual signals, with no technological oversight. This is why PTC has been implemented in the US already - Canada lags behind this advance. ML is beginning to test advanced train control, but slowly - and it's not an implementation that happens in a flash.
The lack of provincial regulatory oversight has been flagged in the past - I recall a similar warning after a fatal incident in Kitchener, will try to find that report. And personally I would trust TSB investigators more than a fledgling Ontario rail safety investigator if one were ever established.
No one likes regulation, but a public institution that moves thousands of people every day should expect to have intrusive safety inspections. And better technology. And be required to account publicly for failures.
- Paul
In North America the term would be "movement exceeds limits of authority" or more specifically a violation of CROR Rule 439 (which defines a 'stop' signal)
For context, one can find data here
https://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/stats/rail/2024/sser-ssro-2024.html#tsb-common-toc-57hlu64omqp-item-4 (frustrating failure of my tablet word processor rhat won't let me embed the link, sorry)
on how often this is happening in Canada. ML data will not appear in this tabulation because ML is not required to report incidents to Ottawa. The fact that similar data is not made public at provincial level is indeed a serious failure in public transparency.
Without knowing the details of this incident (which we should not prejudge) one can be fairly certain that a train which reached a stop signal at the reported 112 km/h should have already passed one or more ""approach" signals which would have indicated a need to slow down and prepare to stop.
The reality is, in Canada "limits to authority" in signalled territory are managed by human beings reading and interpreting the colour and indication of visual signals, with no technological oversight. This is why PTC has been implemented in the US already - Canada lags behind this advance. ML is beginning to test advanced train control, but slowly - and it's not an implementation that happens in a flash.
The lack of provincial regulatory oversight has been flagged in the past - I recall a similar warning after a fatal incident in Kitchener, will try to find that report. And personally I would trust TSB investigators more than a fledgling Ontario rail safety investigator if one were ever established.
No one likes regulation, but a public institution that moves thousands of people every day should expect to have intrusive safety inspections. And better technology. And be required to account publicly for failures.
- Paul
Last edited:
Allandale25
Senior Member
This incident also reminds me of the fatal VIA Rail crash in Burlington with similar circumstances I believe. cc @crs1026 @smallspy
en.wikipedia.org
2012 Burlington Via derailment - Wikipedia
generalcanada
Senior Member
worth noting MX said the crew for this incident had been dismissed.
Probably means some mistake they dont want people to know about
Probably means some mistake they dont want people to know about
atakagi1
New Member
Hi everyone, thanks for reading.
For those of you who don't have a subscription and would like to read the full article, here's a gift link: https://www.thestar.com/gift-redeem?t=5efe0bca-6918-4b43-bcc0-fa660ec2ce77
Your support helps keeps work like this possible.
For those of you who don't have a subscription and would like to read the full article, here's a gift link: https://www.thestar.com/gift-redeem?t=5efe0bca-6918-4b43-bcc0-fa660ec2ce77
Your support helps keeps work like this possible.
crs1026
Superstar
One has to remember that in a unionised setting, which GO operations is, the decision to terminate someone for cause requires a great deal of due diligence as it can be challenged at arbitration. In other words, if the employer is saying that they proceeded to terminate, it means they have investigated and have amassed a body of facts that they believe justifies the firings. So, if they have that investigation and analysis, why is it not public ? ( Arbitration awards, especially in railway space, do reach the public domain.....much later)
It is quite possible that the public disclosure that people were fired is part of a PR strategy and is less than the complete story about causes and mitigating factors. It would not be the first time that firings (and later reinstatements) were decided by legal and PR considerations. The firing is public theatre and satisfies the court of public opinion, the legal decision comes later and may be settled in the back room. I have seen this done in my own career.
So, I don't trust this disclosure as final word on the matter. That's why we need independent third party investigations by safety experts.
- Paul