micheal_can
Senior Member
How do you define "that bad"? Obviously, no one would knowingly allow a bridge, etc. to be unsafe, but non-destructive testing and visual inspections have their limits. If they pick some arbitrary line, like 'every bridge must be replaced after 50 years', you hasten a line to potentially become unprofitable faster and an unprofitable line is an abandoned line. It's a lot more common in aviation when certain components are replaced at 'x' hours, period, and that is baked into the cost of flying.
Risk management in this sense is a constant balance between good public policy and economic viability.
A bridge collapsing is "that bad" to me. I am certain Transport Canada has a threshold for what they would classify as "that bad". Remember, this is not a normal bridge. It is a movable bridge. Maybe TC puts an age limit on moving bridges. That might be an option. The issue is, before a knee jerk response from us, we need to know why it failed.
If the partnership on one end has failed the public, what then? Is this a one off, or is it a sign of an underlying systemic problem? Since we know that these days CN and CP as well as many short lines try to do the least amount of work to maintain their lines to allow higher profits, this could be a 'tip of the iceberg' moment, or it could be a one off fluke incident. We do not know.I was obviously not making a direct comparison.
You will never see a return to a system of redundant inspections. The entire point of the SMS was to drive responsibility back to the operators under guise of a 'partnership'. The regulator (government) got to have a lot few inspectors. So-called 'independent' inspectors would essentially be government contract workers because they would have to operate under the authority of legislation and probably be twice as expensive.