That's a crucial point, as in New York and London UK, levies are directly assessed to get projects like this done. In the case of the Infrastructure Bank, positively affected developers can *bolster* the business case by either directly contributing funding to the project, and/or being part of the consortium underwriting and building the project, and holding shares and having a seat on the board, and getting a yield on their investment in multiple ways.
It's beyond ironic how Tory claimed "SmartTrack is our Crossrail" (They both have tracks and trains, and that's about it), but meanwhile:
How Crossrail is paid for
The Greater London Authority (GLA) is expected to contribute around
£4.1bn (of its agreed contribution to the £15.9 billion Crossrail project) using income generated from a new business rates supplement (BRS). Powers were granted to the GLA to introduce this under the 2009 Business Rates Supplements Act.
The policies for the Crossrail BRS are set out in the
final prospectus. From 1 April 2017 the Crossrail BRS will only apply to properties on the rating list with a rateable value above £70,000 to reflect the impact of the 2017 revaluation of non domestic properties as explained below.
Less than one in five of London’s business and other non-domestic premises are liable to pay the Crossrail BRS. Under the BRS a ratepayer for a property (or rating assessment) with a rateable value of £100,000 is liable for an annual BRS contribution of £2,000 (that is, £100,000 x the 2p in the pound BRS multiplier).
Reliefs for the BRS (such as registered charities) will apply on the same basis and at the same rate as for National Non-Domestic Rates (NNDR).
[...]
https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-d...don/paying-crossrail-business-rate-supplement
No free ride for developers in 'World Class Cities'. The Line 7 extension in NYC was paid for completely from City and Developer funds, not state or federal aid.
Edit to Add:
[...]
3. It was paid for by the city with an innovative funding scheme.
Bloomberg wanted the 7 train so badly that rather than wait for the MTA to drum up the money (he’d still be waiting), the administration said the city itself would foot the bill. The funding structure they devised, known as “tax incremental financing,” was an innovative one—at least by the standards of U.S. transportation funding. The city
issued bonds for the construction to be repaid by future tax revenue from developers whose property value would soar once the extension was complete.
On paper, at least, the plan was a great example of what’s called “value capture”—leveraging real estate gains for the good of public transit. In practice, of course, there were hiccups. Officials later ended up giving Hudson Yards developers a tax subsidy, which Columbia University planning scholar David King
called “exactly the opposite of capturing increased property values.”
[...]
https://www.citylab.com/transportat...ew-york-subways-new-7-train-extension/404800/