Damaged T1 Cars from Apr. 2008 Accident

[andomano]

This thread has been created mainly to end the confusion that has plagued the new subway thread. The report from the TTC lists the damaged cars as 5185, 5184, 5326, and 5327. Repairs for these 4 cars have been ballparked at 3.6 million, with the TTC reserving 4.1 million as an upset amount.
The full report regarding their procurement for repair and testing is available here: http://www3.ttc.ca/About_the_TTC/Commission_reports_and_information/Commission_meetings/2008/Dec_17_2008/Supplementary_Reports/Repair%20and%20Testing%20o.pdf

I have posted some of these pictures in another thread, but I believe it is appropriate to repost in this proper thread. Here are some pictures of the damaged cars at the Thunder Bay Bombardier facility:

 

[hkric88]

Thanks ando, those are definitely T1s!

 

[Agram]

Those units were parked inside Wilson for months on 11 track, its looks even worse if you saw them in person. The blue tarp is covering it up, it is unbelievebale how much the floor bent. But thats what happens when you are clocked doing about 55 kmh head on. The driver of who was at fault was knocked out through the windshield while the 2nd driver sustained minor injuries mainly to his knee. The 2nd driver came back to work after a short stint on sick benefits and soon retired after that, too bad as he was a solid worker.

 

[andomano]

Subways probably aren't designed with crumple zones like cars are.

55km/h! I thought that yard speed was around 15km/h!

 

[smallspy]

Also interesting to note that the steel underframe was what buckled, and not the aluminum structure of the roof.

Subways probably aren't designed with crumple zones like cars are.

With almost every cubic foot of space inside the car body used for carrying passengers, how do you create a crumple zone?

Dan
Toronto, Ont.

 

[kettal]

I know a guy who, for years, has refused to sit near the front or back of the subway train, in fear of a collision.

 

[interchange42]

Since the Russell Hill collision?

It would be pretty near impossible for that to happen again: all of the faulty trip-arms were replaced.

42

 

[CDL.TO]

Since the Russell Hill collision?

It would be pretty near impossible for that to happen again: all of the faulty trip-arms were replaced.

I'm pretty sure that before the accident that everyone would have agreed that it would have been pretty near impossible for what happened, to happen.

Other things could go wrong as well. Perhaps a faulty dead-man's switch (which is sort-of what caused the Hinton train crash).

But that's all speculation, of course. I sit at the front of the train all the time.
`

 

[smallspy]

Other things could go wrong as well. Perhaps a faulty dead-man's switch (which is sort-of what caused the Hinton train crash).

There is no comparison between the subway and heavy rail. The subway has physical wayside devices that are very difficult to circumvent and that will always* prevent a runaway or a missed signal. Heavy rail in Canada doesn't have any sort of wayside system to prevent that kind of situation, and so relies solely on the good graces of the crews.

Dan
Toronto, Ont.

*yes, I know that 99.9999999% is not always, but for arguments sake here it is.

 

[CDL.TO]

There is no comparison between the subway and heavy rail. The subway has physical wayside devices that are very difficult to circumvent and that will always* prevent a runaway or a missed signal. Heavy rail in Canada doesn't have any sort of wayside system to prevent that kind of situation, and so relies solely on the good graces of the crews.

I know how the subway works.

The only point I was trying to make is... things can (and do) go wrong. Murphy's law. I think problems arise when we start telling ourselves that accidents are pretty near impossible when "pretty near impossible" accidents have occurred in the past caused by things not working like they are supposed to.

Deadman's switches should work properly. Switch points should work properly. Signals should work properly. Trainstops should work properly. Drivers should stop at red signals. Brakes should work properly. Debris that could cause a derailment should be kept clear of the tracks.

Nice to have you on the forum, BTW Dan G.

 

[smallspy]

I know how the subway works.

The only point I was trying to make is... things can (and do) go wrong. Murphy's law. I think problems arise when we start telling ourselves that accidents are pretty near impossible when "pretty near impossible" accidents have occurred in the past caused by things not working like they are supposed to.

Deadman's switches should work properly. Switch points should work properly. Signals should work properly. Trainstops should work properly. Drivers should stop at red signals. Brakes should work properly. Debris that could cause a derailment should be kept clear of the tracks.

Nice to have you on the forum, BTW Dan G.

Well hold on a sec here - mechanical bits are only as good as the people (and tools) who design and install them. In most cases, they are not the problem.

The problem is with the actual control of the train - in this case a human being. A lot of those mechanical bits are there solely to keep an eye on the human and make sure that they don't do anything callous or nefarious. And on the subway, those mechanical bits are not easily accessed by operating crews specifically to try and keep the system safe.

For the record, the cause of the accident at Hinton was due to an overly-tired crew circumventing their safety systems (the dead-man's switch) and a lack of will of other crew members to step in when they felt it was unsafe. Had there been system in place like the trip stops on the subway, the accident might have never happened, or might have been far less serious.

I'm not going to kid myself and everyone else around me and say that the subway is 100% safe - no system can be. But it is pretty damn safe, and the chances of another Russell Hill are slim enough that I feel confident in saying that it won't happen in my lifetime.

Dan
Toronto, Ont.

 

[CDL.TO]

Well hold on a sec here - mechanical bits are only as good as the people (and tools) who design and install them. In most cases, they are not the problem.

The problem is with the actual control of the train - in this case a human being. A lot of those mechanical bits are there solely to keep an eye on the human and make sure that they don't do anything callous or nefarious. And on the subway, those mechanical bits are not easily accessed by operating crews specifically to try and keep the system safe.

For the record, the cause of the accident at Hinton was due to an overly-tired crew circumventing their safety systems (the dead-man's switch) and a lack of will of other crew members to step in when they felt it was unsafe. Had there been system in place like the trip stops on the subway, the accident might have never happened, or might have been far less serious.

I'm not going to kid myself and everyone else around me and say that the subway is 100% safe - no system can be. But it is pretty damn safe, and the chances of another Russell Hill are slim enough that I feel confident in saying that it won't happen in my lifetime.

So we agree.

 

[andomano]

..... So what caused this accident then?
And wasn't there one two or so weeks prior to this one also?

 

[Agram]

Not sure if you guys know this but there is another T1 unit up in Thunder Bay, it was damaged last year at Davisville Yard. The T1 was in a collision with an H5 whose brakes released and came in contact with the T1. The whole front end of the H5 was damaged, but we got a whole new piece from the training department. They were going to scrap their H5 simulator so we just took it and put it on the unit.......looks brand new lol So that means we are down one whole T1 train.

 

[smallspy]

So we agree.

I didn't think that we disagreed, although I will still argue that you can't use the Hinton (or any other heavy rail accident) as a basis on which to argue subway safety.

Dan
Toronto, Ont.