I’m afraid that my figures rather show the opposite (if you refer to the additional paragraph I added under the table after I prematurely posted my reply), but to simply quote myself in said post on SSP:So if i understand this right the train running more often had better revenues and cost recovery? So it would actually make sense for it to run more often, which allows more people to take it. Also taking into consideration that Greyhound is now gone, and air travel is a mess, people may be more option to other options?
Now, if your theory that revenues decrease faster than costs when cutting frequencies on non-Corridor routes was correct, the direct operating loss per train-km should have increased since 1990 (when frequencies were cut from daily service to 3 trains per week) and the cost-recovery rate (i.e. direct revenues divided by direct costs) should have decreased.
So what happens when we compare the figures from 1988 with those of 2018? On the Ocean, the direct operating loss per train-km decreased (rather than: increased) by 1.1%, whereas the cost-recovery rate improved (rather than: deteriorated) from 40.8% to 48.9%. On the Canadian, the direct operating loss per train-km even decreased dramatically (by 77.2%), whereas the cost-recovery rate almost doubled (from 48.3% to 90.3%).