TTC: Other Items (catch all)

[Northern Light]

Wow. https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/20...within-seconds-of-a-disastrous-collision.html

Beyond the paywall: https://outline.com/Xb6cR2

The trains ended up within 1M of each other.............yikes.

I agree w/ @allengeorge above that ATC per se is not likely the issue.

The issue seems to be that the TTC disabled ATC in the pocket track.

I find that very odd.

But I also wonder this......

In the above article it is suggested than there was still a wayside signal in the pocket track, and that it was red.

My recollection is that a train running a red was supposed to trigger its emergency brake.

I'd like to know if that is still how its supposed to work?; if not, why not?; and if so, why didn't it?

 

[W. K. Lis]

From link.

 

[smallspy]

The trains ended up within 1M of each other.............yikes.

I agree w/ @allengeorge above that ATC per se is not likely the issue.

The issue seems to be that the TTC disabled ATC in the pocket track.

I find that very odd.

But I also wonder this......

In the above article it is suggested than there was still a wayside signal in the pocket track, and that it was red.

My recollection is that a train running a red was supposed to trigger its emergency brake.

I'd like to know if that is still how its supposed to work?; if not, why not?; and if so, why didn't it?

The wayside signals are used to guard the entry into the logical "blocks" in a situation where a train is operating outside of the signal system, such as the case here.

However, there are no wayside devices - trip cocks - to physically enforce the stopping of a train. All of that stuff has been moved to onboard the trains - the train is capable of calculating if it needs to apply the emergency brakes, and the signal system is capable of demanding an emergency stop from any individual train.

But that's only if the trains are actually operating within the signal system.

If a train isn't, as is the case here, the system is blind.

Dan

 

[Northern Light]

The wayside signals are used to guard the entry into the logical "blocks" in a situation where a train is operating outside of the signal system, such as the case here.

However, there are no wayside devices - trip cocks - to physically enforce the stopping of a train. All of that stuff has been moved to onboard the trains - the train is capable of calculating if it needs to apply the emergency brakes, and the signal system is capable of demanding an emergency stop from any individual train.

But that's only if the trains are actually operating within the signal system.

If a train isn't, as is the case here, the system is blind.

Dan

Great info Dan, much appreciated.

****

But leaves me wondering about the decision to remove the trips IF they are also going to allow manual operation.

 

[drum118]

Up to 100 future weekend closures eliminated as TTC completes final 10-day closure between St George and St Andrew stations

June 4, 2021

Last week, the TTC completed its third 10-day closure on the portion of Line 1 between St George and St Andrew stations. The closure, which took place from May 17-26, allowed the TTC to take advantage of continued low ridership to make significant progress on critical state-of-good repair work.

The work accomplished during the three 10-day shutdowns will allow the TTC to eliminate between 75-100 planned weekend closures over the next few years as well as eliminate the need to bypass Museum and Queen's Park stations for up to two years.

With the completion of this series of closures, TTC commuters can now look forward to significantly reduced early access, weekend and platform closures. Customers who were surveyed while travelling through the area during the closures reported overwhelming support for the TTC's innovative approach to completing the work quickly and reducing inconvenience.

During the three 10-day closures in March, April and May, the TTC removed and replaced approximately 44,000 sq. ft. of ceiling in the affected stations. Repair work was also completed on the flooring at Museum, Queen's Park and Osgoode stations.

"We've eliminated up to 100 future TTC closures by getting this important work done during the pandemic when ridership levels have been lower," said Mayor John Tory. "Thank you so much to our TTC workers for getting this job accelerated and done during this unprecedented emergency. Thank you to our TTC riders for their patience as we completed these important repairs, including much-needed asbestos removal. This work will ensure we continue to have a safe and reliable transit system for years to come and that we are ready to welcome riders back as we safely reopen."

"Over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, the TTC has rapidly accelerated extensive system upgrades and state-of-good-repair projects on our subway network to minimize future disruption for transit riders," said TTC Chair Jaye Robinson. "This innovative approach has significantly reduced the need for planned closures, with up to 100 weekend closures avoided over the next few years. Congratulations to CEO Rick Leary and the entire TTC team for this impressive accomplishment. I would also like to thank our TTC riders for their continued patience and understanding."

"By doing this work while ridership is low, we've been able to spare our customers years of disruption and inconvenience," said TTC CEO Rick Leary. "I'm very pleased that we were able to accomplish this much in a relatively short period of time - we've done approximately 18 months of work in 30 days. I want to thank everyone involved for their hard work, and thank our customers for their patience."

During the most recent closure, the TTC removed asbestos from the southbound platforms of St Patrick and Queen's Park stations, which completes asbestos abatement in this area. In March and April, asbestos was removed from the northbound platforms of these stations.

Additional work done includes the installation of higher capacity traction power cables, and the removal of old cables. TTC crews also installed new communication infrastructure, including additional Train Door Monitoring conduits for future OPTO implementation at Osgoode and Museum stations.

By completing planned maintenance ahead of schedule, the TTC can now turn its attention to architectural refinishing and modernization of the station platforms. That contract is expected to be tendered later this year for 2022 construction.

The TTC thanks its Board, local City Councillors, and the essential workers based along University Ave., for their assistance and patience with the closures this year.

 

[Richard White]

But leaves me wondering about the decision to remove the trips IF they are also going to allow manual operation.

Something tells me that will be a decision they regret. If there is a technological issue resulting in a runaway train or things of that nature there would be nothing to stop the train.

 

[DSC]

Funny thing was that based on the timings, I like would have been on that train heading northbound.

There were 5 passengers so this is fairly unlikely and , if you were , chances that you or any passenger would have been in a part of the train badly affected would be slight. Anyway, just as well you are OK

 

[Richard White]

There were 5 passengers so this is fairly unlikely and , if you were , chances that you or any passenger would have been in a part of the train badly affected would be slight. Anyway, just as well you are OK

Yea I used to work Monday to Friday 3-11 at that time down at Maple Leaf Square. I usually got out of there closer to 11:30. You are right, it was unlikely but I would have been leaving work onboard a train at some point around then.

I have been on a train that slammed on the E-Brake because someone tried to jump. Not a fun situation, I went flying from one end of the car to the other but hey.. at least we stopped dead in seconds.

 

[crs1026]

^It seems a little bizarre that we would spend all that money to resignal but leave operators, or control center staff, with the discretion to switch to manual. That’s a workaround. If ATC can’t fathom pocket tracks, that’s a big deficiency.

The principle of “if you can’t see a signal is showing a permissive indication, you can’t assume it is permissive” is so fundamental to rail safety - anywhere - that I can’t fathom the Union’s position on this one.

- Paul

 

[DSC]

The extended closures of the University part of Line 1 really seemed like a good idea. Not that I want to see the Yonge side receive similar treatment BUT are the same asbestos, ceiling and wiring problems there too? Should they schedule a Yonge closure?

 

[smallspy]

Great info Dan, much appreciated.

****

But leaves me wondering about the decision to remove the trips IF they are also going to allow manual operation.

The onboard equipment of the train is never fully disabled, and is able to put the train into emergency. This is why all of the work equipment also needs some minimal equipment installed onboard.

But to have the system itself turned off on a section of track? That's a whole different ball of worms. And there's really no easy way for the system as a whole to deal with that now.

Dan

 

[smallspy]

^It seems a little bizarre that we would spend all that money to resignal but leave operators, or control center staff, with the discretion to switch to manual. That’s a workaround. If ATC can’t fathom pocket tracks, that’s a big deficiency.

The principle of “if you can’t see a signal is showing a permissive indication, you can’t assume it is permissive” is so fundamental to rail safety - anywhere - that I can’t fathom the Union’s position on this one.

- Paul

The issue isn't manual per se. The system is designed to deal with that. Trains regularly get operated in a manual mode while in the midst of the ATC system all the time.

The issue is with turning the system off entirely. Then, it becomes blind.

Dan

 

[BB ON]

View attachment 325062
From link.

Really bad all around. The crew parked the train in the wrong spot (not far enough into the pocket to see the exit signal) and proceeded without authority. The signal system let that happen.

The entire point of the system is to enforce movements of trains, so there needs to be a really good justification as to this oversight.

In this case the actions were intentional, but this could just as easily happen unintentionally. Brakes fail -- if the train rolls and fouls the mainline, the system needs to be aware. In safety engineering, you basically have to assume your users are actively trying to kill themselves.

Even if there was no conflicting train, they would have proceeded into an incorrectly lined switch and possibly derailed.

 

[Streety McCarface]

This all being said, was the TTC really in the right to dismiss the two operators? That seems absurd to me.

 

[max]

This all being said, was the TTC really in the right to dismiss the two operators? That seems absurd to me.

They weren't dismissed, they were suspended, the operator for one week and the guard for two days.