GO Transit: Service thread (including extensions)

[Metroscapes]

GO train near Oakville was seconds away from ‘worst-case’ derailment, internal Metrolinx report shows

Experts raise concerns about the GO network’s safety infrastructure and Metrolinx’s transparency.

www.thestar.com

https://archive.is/N3j7a

A GO train carrying 120 passengers was within seconds of derailing near Oakville earlier this year, according to an internal Metrolinx report...which [it] says was the fourth time a GO train sped past a stop signal over the previous 12 months.

[...]

"...a westbound GO train...blew through a stop signal and crossed over to a different track at about 112 km/h when it should have only been travelling at about 24 km/h..."

[...]

According to the Metrolinx report, an internal investigation would be completed within 60 to 75 days of the incident. But no report has so far been made public and there is no indication from the provincial transit agency that it will be.
Alstom did not respond to the Star’s request for comment before deadline. [...]

“The incident is being reviewed under established rail safety protocols,” said Dakota Brasier, a spokesperson for the Ontario minister of transportation. [...]

Nic Defalco, a spokesperson for the Transportation Safety Board, the federal agency in charge of investigating safety incidents on Canada’s railway network, told the Star it is not currently investigating the Jan. 5 incident.

In a statement to the Star, Metrolinx spokesperson Lyndsay Miller said that the two Alstom operators of the train have been dismissed.
“While taking GO Transit continues to be one of the safest ways to travel, this incident provides an important opportunity to reinforce safety compliance across our rail network,” Miller said.
Ian Naish, former director of rail investigations at the TSB, said it was “extremely surprising” the train didn’t actually derail.
Had the train driver braked 1.5 seconds later, as laid out in the report, “it had the potential to have been one of the worst recorded Metrolinx accidents in its 16-year history,” Naish said. “A high-speed derailment would likely have resulted in multiple passenger injuries and, possibly, some fatalities.”

[...]

Since 2001, the TSB has called for fail-safes that guard against speeding and the subsequent derailments that often occur, but it has not been nationally mandated.
GO Transit currently doesn’t have the safety systems that have become widespread in modern railway systems.
In 2024, Metrolinx announced it would roll out a European-standard signalling system that would include train protection as part of its GO expansion plans. The transit agency has not provided a timeline for when the new signalling system would be implemented.
“The level of protection that GO Transit operates with is essentially the same as Britain’s operating system in the 1940s,” Dennis said.
Meanwhile, the Ontario government and Metrolinx have run increased service on several of the GO network’s busiest routes, including the Lakeshore West and East lines, the Barrie line and the Stouffville line.
“If you’re going to see an increasing level of service on GO transit — as is happening right now — and not seeing a commensurate increase in the level of protection … is that acceptable?” Dennis said. “I would postulate that it isn’t.”

[...]

Neither the January GO incident, nor February’s derailment at Union Station will be subject to an independent investigation, because the TSB has no jurisdiction to investigate safety incidents on provincially owned railways, which is the case for the majority of the GO network.
ARTICLE CONTINUES BELOW


The agency said it only investigates incidents on provincial railways at the request of the Ontario Ministry of Transportation. It also confirmed that there is only one active GO investigation: a signal passed at danger in 2024 that nearly resulted in a collision outside of Aldershot GO Station.
Instead, Metrolinx will conduct its own investigation, with no guarantee the results will be made public as there is no requirement to do so. No public reports on signals passed at danger in the past year have been published.
The TSB has, in the past, called for more regulatory oversight of the GO network, either by the Ministry of Transportation or another government body, as part of a 2023 TSB report on a 2019 incident on Lancaster Street in Kitchener where an adult and child were struck by a GO train.
“Given the current complex (Ontario Ministry of Transportation) regulatory framework that involves multiple agreements, there are gaps in the oversight processes that can lead to occasions when the (Ontario Ministry of Transportation) will not be able to provide effective safety oversight,” the TSB wrote in its report. “The Board is concerned that the Province of Ontario does not provide effective safety oversight of provincially regulated railways.”
More transparency can help spur better regulations and safety technology said Naish, the former TSB director. But as it stands, Metrolinx and the GO network have no independent oversight aside from the provincial government.
“There’s just so much we don’t know … There’s no accountability,” Naish added. “I know it causes bureaucracy and it costs money, but you need to be accountable.”

 

[SkylineHorizons]

https://archive.is/N3j7a

I posted this on the reddit thread but will also post it here so as to better inform more people about how internal operational matters are dealt with over at Alstom


Re: Disciplinary Standards and Government Accountability.

Discipline is generally not disclosed since the crews work for a private company; Alstom, and not a government agency, it is legally considered a privacy matter. But as a former engineer I can say one thing for sure: disciplinary standards on the railway are extremely strict. For starters, crews are effectively treated as guilty right from the outset of an incident. And they are continously viewed as such throughout the investigative process and are presented in that light to the entire workforce.

Following any incident related to a rules violation, or sometimes even just a procedural violation, the crew members involved are immediately removed from service and suspended without pay pending the completion of the investigation, the duration of which is completely unknown at that point. It's nothing like policing, where someone can be involved in an extreme incidents, such as when they killed someone and yet they are almost always suspend "with pay". The crew is then subjected to drug and alcohol testing and are required to surrender their phone records. Testing positive for any prohibited substance understandably results in immediate termination and the same applies if it is determined that they used their phone at any point during the tour of duty.

The investigation itself is presented as a fact-finding process, but in reality it more closely resembles a police interrogation. Mounting any meaningful defense is generally not possible because the accused is typically not given access to critical internal records such as train, track, or signal maintenance logs. In truth, by the time the statement takes place the company has more or less reached its conclusions already. The process then becomes less about determining what actually happened from the accused's perspective and more about strengthening the company's case against the accused in the event the matter goes to arbitration. This is done by framing the accused in the worst possible light, a process that is both highly patronizing and deeply demoralizing.

Interestingly enough, at times Alstom will break its own protocols and keep a crew in service by issuing what they call "deferred discipline" that is no suspension is given, when it is suffering from extreme manpower shortages. This is in order to avoid being penalized for failing to provide the required service levels since it may result in train cancelations. It is quite telling that the usual process suddenly no longer seems to be in the interest of public safety when the company itself faces financial repercussions.

Serious violations, such as passing a stop signal or passing a Rule 42 foreman without authority(a designated track worker with authority over train movements in a work area), commonly result in suspensions of 3 to 6 months. For an engineer that essentially amounts to a substantial financial penalty of roughly $35,000 to $65,000 in lost wages, somewhat less for conductors. A second offense of this type typically leads to permanent dismissal. But even a first serious violation can result in dismissal if the employee already has minor infractions on their record. Employees in these cases are often kept completely in the dark for weeks on end - long after their statement has been given and the investigation should by all reasonable measure be concluded - left unsure whether they still have a job or not.

Once a suspension has run its course the employees must undergo a thorough recertification process. After passing it, they are closely monitored and frequently accompanied on duty for an extended period of time, usually around a year. While there is no debate that this part of process has merit, the problem is that the guilt-based culture that the railroad cultivates means that returning employees are rarely welcomed back without reservation. They are frequently viewed differently, marginalized, and spoken about disparagingly behind their backs not only by other coworkers but by management as well. In many cases the reputational damage sticks with an individual for years, sometimes even for the entire duration of their careers.

The reality, however, is that serious incidents happen with some frequency, and this is nothing new. Violations of this kind have been occurring for generations, largely because the fundamental nature of railway operations in North America. Operations that have changed remarkably little in over 80 years. Consider that the average GO train crew will make over 1,000 foremen calls, approximately 10,000 station stops, and pass somewhere between 25,000 and 50,000 signals in a given year - now multiply those numbers by over 170 train crews. At that scale, the uncomfortable truth becomes unavoidable: people are not machines, and mistakes and accidents do happen. Sometimes it does stem from incompetence yes, but more often it is the result of the fundamental nature of the job, a lack of proper tools, and an ever-increasing workload without adequate mitigation. It should come as no surprise then that red-light violations, speeding incidents, and foreman authority violations occur with some regularity. Rather than addressing this through systemic improvements, the response has largely been to impose changes at the individual level, when in reality there is only so much that can be done to influence human behavior. Over the course of an entire career, a significant portion of the workforce, perhaps half, will have been involved in at least one such incident. That should make it clear that the problem is not individualistic in nature - it's SYSTEMIC. And while Metrolinx has spoken at length about modernization, nothing of significance has been done at the operational level, let alone the technological one. So you tell me where the problem truly lies: with the individual train operators who are specifically selected and rigorously trained for the job - or with an organization that, in nearly twenty years of full operational involvement has yet to meaningfully change the operational limitations of an antiquated system.

Lastly, while having a private corporation run the operation was initially an understandable choice given GO Transit's lack of operational knowledge at the time, that justification has long since expired. Metrolinx could easily bring train crews in-house whenever the operations contract expires, and coincidentally the current contract expires this year. And yet they plan to once again hand Alstom another five-year extension. The implication here speaks for itself, Private corporations, by their very nature, are under no obligation to open their operations to public scrutiny, and governments have long understood this. When something goes wrong, as it did on January 6th, accountability diffuses. The corporation cites confidentiality, the government points to the contract, and the public is left none the wiser. Maintaining that arrangement year after year, extension after extension, achieves something that would be far harder to sustain with a public operator - plausible deniability, and with it the political cover to avoid accountability altogether.

 

[crs1026]

The reality, however, is that serious incidents happen with some frequency, and this is nothing new. Violations of this kind have been occurring for generations, largely because the fundamental nature of railway operations in North America. Operations that have changed remarkably little in over 80 years. Consider that the average GO train crew will make over 1,000 foremen calls, approximately 10,000 station stops, and pass somewhere between 25,000 and 50,000 signals in a given year - now multiply those numbers by over 170 train crews. At that scale, the uncomfortable truth becomes unavoidable: people are not machines, and mistakes and accidents do happen. Sometimes it does stem from incompetence yes, but more often it is the result of the fundamental nature of the job, a lack of proper tools, and an ever-increasing workload without adequate mitigation. It should come as no surprise then that red-light violations, speeding incidents, and foreman authority violations occur with some regularity. Rather than addressing this through systemic improvements, the response has largely been to impose changes at the individual level, when in reality there is only so much that can be done to influence human behavior. Over the course of an entire career, a significant portion of the workforce, perhaps half, will have been involved in at least one such incident. That should make it clear that the problem is not individualistic in nature - it's SYSTEMIC. And while Metrolinx has spoken at length about modernization, nothing of significance has been done at the operational level, let alone the technological one. So you tell me where the problem truly lies: with the individual train operators who are specifically selected and rigorously trained for the job - or with an organization that, in nearly twenty years of full operational involvement has yet to meaningfully change the operational limitations of an antiquated system.

This paragraph says it incredibly well Operating in a railway environment requires processing and retaining an ever increasing number of minor details one after the other, with each small detail having potential for mishap.

Sooner or later, situations arise where a detail is overlooked, or someone is distracted and misses something. There may be bad habits, or momentary lapses, or instances of carelessness or knowing non-compliance -, but even the most reliable and experienced performer will have some bad moments. The system cannot guarantee zero failures.

Some of the modifications and improvements to safety systems are constructive, but many simply add more items to the mental checklist and consequently increase, rather than decrease, the worker's mental processing load . Rarely do these added measures improve concentration, eliminate distractions, or reduce the frequency of out-of-norm events that demand error prone deviation from routine.

The typical response to an incident is to add a rule or special instruction - the old saying "every line of the rule book is written in blood" applies. My impression is that many aspects of rail safety management systems simply ensure paper trails are created but that paper does not actually change the likelihood of future events.

I do think that most people in the system do care about safety and make every effort to be vigilant and compliant - but it's a system built almost totally on the human brain and body. Even good people are fallible. It's a situation that cries for more enlightened solutions - and a willingness to spend money to invest in safety..

- Paul

 

[Bordercollie]

I posted this on the reddit thread but will also post it here so as to better inform more people about how internal operational matters are dealt with over at Alstom


Re: Disciplinary Standards and Government Accountability.

Discipline is generally not disclosed since the crews work for a private company; Alstom, and not a government agency, it is legally considered a privacy matter. But as a former engineer I can say one thing for sure: disciplinary standards on the railway are extremely strict. For starters, crews are effectively treated as guilty right from the outset of an incident. And they are continously viewed as such throughout the investigative process and are presented in that light to the entire workforce.

Following any incident related to a rules violation, or sometimes even just a procedural violation, the crew members involved are immediately removed from service and suspended without pay pending the completion of the investigation, the duration of which is completely unknown at that point. It's nothing like policing, where someone can be involved in an extreme incidents, such as when they killed someone and yet they are almost always suspend "with pay". The crew is then subjected to drug and alcohol testing and are required to surrender their phone records. Testing positive for any prohibited substance understandably results in immediate termination and the same applies if it is determined that they used their phone at any point during the tour of duty.

The investigation itself is presented as a fact-finding process, but in reality it more closely resembles a police interrogation. Mounting any meaningful defense is generally not possible because the accused is typically not given access to critical internal records such as train, track, or signal maintenance logs. In truth, by the time the statement takes place the company has more or less reached its conclusions already. The process then becomes less about determining what actually happened from the accused's perspective and more about strengthening the company's case against the accused in the event the matter goes to arbitration. This is done by framing the accused in the worst possible light, a process that is both highly patronizing and deeply demoralizing.

Interestingly enough, at times Alstom will break its own protocols and keep a crew in service by issuing what they call "deferred discipline" that is no suspension is given, when it is suffering from extreme manpower shortages. This is in order to avoid being penalized for failing to provide the required service levels since it may result in train cancelations. It is quite telling that the usual process suddenly no longer seems to be in the interest of public safety when the company itself faces financial repercussions.

Serious violations, such as passing a stop signal or passing a Rule 42 foreman without authority(a designated track worker with authority over train movements in a work area), commonly result in suspensions of 3 to 6 months. For an engineer that essentially amounts to a substantial financial penalty of roughly $35,000 to $65,000 in lost wages, somewhat less for conductors. A second offense of this type typically leads to permanent dismissal. But even a first serious violation can result in dismissal if the employee already has minor infractions on their record. Employees in these cases are often kept completely in the dark for weeks on end - long after their statement has been given and the investigation should by all reasonable measure be concluded - left unsure whether they still have a job or not.

Once a suspension has run its course the employees must undergo a thorough recertification process. After passing it, they are closely monitored and frequently accompanied on duty for an extended period of time, usually around a year. While there is no debate that this part of process has merit, the problem is that the guilt-based culture that the railroad cultivates means that returning employees are rarely welcomed back without reservation. They are frequently viewed differently, marginalized, and spoken about disparagingly behind their backs not only by other coworkers but by management as well. In many cases the reputational damage sticks with an individual for years, sometimes even for the entire duration of their careers.

The reality, however, is that serious incidents happen with some frequency, and this is nothing new. Violations of this kind have been occurring for generations, largely because the fundamental nature of railway operations in North America. Operations that have changed remarkably little in over 80 years. Consider that the average GO train crew will make over 1,000 foremen calls, approximately 10,000 station stops, and pass somewhere between 25,000 and 50,000 signals in a given year - now multiply those numbers by over 170 train crews. At that scale, the uncomfortable truth becomes unavoidable: people are not machines, and mistakes and accidents do happen. Sometimes it does stem from incompetence yes, but more often it is the result of the fundamental nature of the job, a lack of proper tools, and an ever-increasing workload without adequate mitigation. It should come as no surprise then that red-light violations, speeding incidents, and foreman authority violations occur with some regularity. Rather than addressing this through systemic improvements, the response has largely been to impose changes at the individual level, when in reality there is only so much that can be done to influence human behavior. Over the course of an entire career, a significant portion of the workforce, perhaps half, will have been involved in at least one such incident. That should make it clear that the problem is not individualistic in nature - it's SYSTEMIC. And while Metrolinx has spoken at length about modernization, nothing of significance has been done at the operational level, let alone the technological one. So you tell me where the problem truly lies: with the individual train operators who are specifically selected and rigorously trained for the job - or with an organization that, in nearly twenty years of full operational involvement has yet to meaningfully change the operational limitations of an antiquated system.

Lastly, while having a private corporation run the operation was initially an understandable choice given GO Transit's lack of operational knowledge at the time, that justification has long since expired. Metrolinx could easily bring train crews in-house whenever the operations contract expires, and coincidentally the current contract expires this year. And yet they plan to once again hand Alstom another five-year extension. The implication here speaks for itself, Private corporations, by their very nature, are under no obligation to open their operations to public scrutiny, and governments have long understood this. When something goes wrong, as it did on January 6th, accountability diffuses. The corporation cites confidentiality, the government points to the contract, and the public is left none the wiser. Maintaining that arrangement year after year, extension after extension, achieves something that would be far harder to sustain with a public operator - plausible deniability, and with it the political cover to avoid accountability altogether.

Originally GO was operated by CN, CP crews which was taken over by Bombardier? Why would Metrolinx bring it in-house now?

 

[SkylineHorizons]

Originally GO was operated by CN, CP crews which was taken over by Bombardier? Why would Metrolinx bring it in-house now?

For one, there have been rumours for some time that this was seriously being considered, which would indicate ongoing tension in the relationship. Bus operations for instance are all in house, but there's a lot less that can go wrong there. That said, my guess is this was largely a negotiating tactic with the renewal coming up - that helps here because I don't believe there are any other interested parties, especially after the Onxpress fiasco(but smallspy would know better about that). But I doubt it was ever a serious consideration considering how well the current arrangement serves to insulate Queen's Park.

As to the why, independent research has repeatedly found that private operations in Ontario cost taxpayers more, not less. With the supposed cost savings accruing primarily to the private partner, not the government.

 

[Bordercollie]

For one, there have been rumours for some time that this was seriously being considered, which would indicate ongoing tension in the relationship. Bus operations for instance are all in house, but there's a lot less that can go wrong there. That said, my guess is this was largely a negotiating tactic with the renewal coming up. I doubt it was ever a serious consideration considering how well the current arrangement serves to insulate Queen's Park. Furthermore I don't believe there are any other interested parties, especially after the Onxpress fiasco, but someone like smallspy would know far more.

As to the why, independent research has repeatedly found that private operations in Ontario cost taxpayers more, not less. With the supposed cost savings accruing primarily to the private partner, not the government.

If it's cheaper to do it in house then why the P3 projects like cross linx and Finch LRT?

 

[SkylineHorizons]

If it's cheaper to do it in house then why the P3 projects like cross linx and Finch LRT?

As I said, P3s serve to insulate those in power. Costs savings are always claimed to be the most important factor, as yet;

The cost ballooned from $5 billion to $13 billion

Light at the end of the tunnel for one of Canada's most expensive transit projects

While it's expected the Eglington LRT will start in September, there is no firm opening date. However, it has reached a critical milestone.

vancouver.citynews.ca

The original budget for the project was $2.5 billion but a report released by Metrolinx this past fall indicated the price tag had ballooned to $3.7 billion

A Finch West LRT look back: The rocky road to completion - Daily Commercial News

A few weeks back, on a cold December morning before the sun came up, transit brass, politicians and riders came together to launch the long-awaited and very expensive Finch West Light Rail Transit line which runs 10.3-kilometres along Finch from Keele Str

canada.constructconnect.com

How is it not clear by now that this is a false narrative??

 

[Metroscapes]

Discipline is generally not disclosed since the crews work for a private company; Alstom, and not a government agency, it is legally considered a privacy matter. But as a former engineer I can say one thing for sure: disciplinary standards on the railway are extremely strict. For starters, crews are effectively treated as guilty right from the outset of an incident. And they are continously viewed as such throughout the investigative process and are presented in that light to the entire workforce.

Following any incident related to a rules violation, or sometimes even just a procedural violation, the crew members involved are immediately removed from service and suspended without pay pending the completion of the investigation, the duration of which is completely unknown at that point. It's nothing like policing, where someone can be involved in an extreme incidents, such as when they killed someone and yet they are almost always suspend "with pay". The crew is then subjected to drug and alcohol testing and are required to surrender their phone records. Testing positive for any prohibited substance understandably results in immediate termination and the same applies if it is determined that they used their phone at any point during the tour of duty.

The investigation itself is presented as a fact-finding process, but in reality it more closely resembles a police interrogation. Mounting any meaningful defense is generally not possible because the accused is typically not given access to critical internal records such as train, track, or signal maintenance logs. In truth, by the time the statement takes place the company has more or less reached its conclusions already. The process then becomes less about determining what actually happened from the accused's perspective and more about strengthening the company's case against the accused in the event the matter goes to arbitration. This is done by framing the accused in the worst possible light, a process that is both highly patronizing and deeply demoralizing.

Interestingly enough, at times Alstom will break its own protocols and keep a crew in service by issuing what they call "deferred discipline" that is no suspension is given, when it is suffering from extreme manpower shortages. This is in order to avoid being penalized for failing to provide the required service levels since it may result in train cancelations. It is quite telling that the usual process suddenly no longer seems to be in the interest of public safety when the company itself faces financial repercussions.

Serious violations, such as passing a stop signal or passing a Rule 42 foreman without authority(a designated track worker with authority over train movements in a work area), commonly result in suspensions of 3 to 6 months. For an engineer that essentially amounts to a substantial financial penalty of roughly $35,000 to $65,000 in lost wages, somewhat less for conductors. A second offense of this type typically leads to permanent dismissal. But even a first serious violation can result in dismissal if the employee already has minor infractions on their record. Employees in these cases are often kept completely in the dark for weeks on end - long after their statement has been given and the investigation should by all reasonable measure be concluded - left unsure whether they still have a job or not.

Once a suspension has run its course the employees must undergo a thorough recertification process. After passing it, they are closely monitored and frequently accompanied on duty for an extended period of time, usually around a year. While there is no debate that this part of process has merit, the problem is that the guilt-based culture that the railroad cultivates means that returning employees are rarely welcomed back without reservation. They are frequently viewed differently, marginalized, and spoken about disparagingly behind their backs not only by other coworkers but by management as well. In many cases the reputational damage sticks with an individual for years, sometimes even for the entire duration of their careers.

The reality, however, is that serious incidents happen with some frequency, and this is nothing new. Violations of this kind have been occurring for generations, largely because the fundamental nature of railway operations in North America. Operations that have changed remarkably little in over 80 years. Consider that the average GO train crew will make over 1,000 foremen calls, approximately 10,000 station stops, and pass somewhere between 25,000 and 50,000 signals in a given year - now multiply those numbers by over 170 train crews. At that scale, the uncomfortable truth becomes unavoidable: people are not machines, and mistakes and accidents do happen. Sometimes it does stem from incompetence yes, but more often it is the result of the fundamental nature of the job, a lack of proper tools, and an ever-increasing workload without adequate mitigation. It should come as no surprise then that red-light violations, speeding incidents, and foreman authority violations occur with some regularity. Rather than addressing this through systemic improvements, the response has largely been to impose changes at the individual level, when in reality there is only so much that can be done to influence human behavior. Over the course of an entire career, a significant portion of the workforce, perhaps half, will have been involved in at least one such incident. That should make it clear that the problem is not individualistic in nature - it's SYSTEMIC. And while Metrolinx has spoken at length about modernization, nothing of significance has been done at the operational level, let alone the technological one. So you tell me where the problem truly lies: with the individual train operators who are specifically selected and rigorously trained for the job - or with an organization that, in nearly twenty years of full operational involvement has yet to meaningfully change the operational limitations of an antiquated system.

Lastly, while having a private corporation run the operation was initially an understandable choice given GO Transit's lack of operational knowledge at the time, that justification has long since expired. Metrolinx could easily bring train crews in-house whenever the operations contract expires, and coincidentally the current contract expires this year. And yet they plan to once again hand Alstom another five-year extension. The implication here speaks for itself, Private corporations, by their very nature, are under no obligation to open their operations to public scrutiny, and governments have long understood this. When something goes wrong, as it did on January 6th, accountability diffuses. The corporation cites confidentiality, the government points to the contract, and the public is left none the wiser. Maintaining that arrangement year after year, extension after extension, achieves something that would be far harder to sustain with a public operator - plausible deniability, and with it the political cover to avoid accountability altogether.

This paragraph says it incredibly well Operating in a railway environment requires processing and retaining an ever increasing number of minor details one after the other, with each small detail having potential for mishap.

Sooner or later, situations arise where a detail is overlooked, or someone is distracted and misses something. There may be bad habits, or momentary lapses, or instances of carelessness or knowing non-compliance -, but even the most reliable and experienced performer will have some bad moments. The system cannot guarantee zero failures.

Some of the modifications and improvements to safety systems are constructive, but many simply add more items to the mental checklist and consequently increase, rather than decrease, the worker's mental processing load . Rarely do these added measures improve concentration, eliminate distractions, or reduce the frequency of out-of-norm events that demand error prone deviation from routine.

The typical response to an incident is to add a rule or special instruction - the old saying "every line of the rule book is written in blood" applies. My impression is that many aspects of rail safety management systems simply ensure paper trails are created but that paper does not actually change the likelihood of future events.

I do think that most people in the system do care about safety and make every effort to be vigilant and compliant - but it's a system built almost totally on the human brain and body. Even good people are fallible. It's a situation that cries for more enlightened solutions - and a willingness to spend money to invest in safety..

- Paul

This feels like it's solely blaming a P3 structure for these woes, I believe GO not being subject to Transportation Safety Board of Canada's jurisdiction is absolutely ridiculous, and is what primarily enables Metrolinx and Alstom to be unaccountable. This is something you could put in line with some simple short legislation.

 

[PL1]

This feels like it's solely blaming a P3 structure for these woes, I believe GO not being subject to Transportation Safety Board of Canada's jurisdiction is absolutely ridiculous, and is what primarily enables Metrolinx and Alstom to be unaccountable. This is something you could put in line with some simple short legislation.

What I find surprising is that GO is subject to Federal regulations for safety, but apparently not accident investigation. TSB investigations are independent, and facts based. They don't seek to blame. Read their aviation investigation reports

 

[SkylineHorizons]

This feels like it's solely blaming a P3 structure for these woes, I believe GO not being subject to Transportation Safety Board of Canada's jurisdiction is absolutely ridiculous, and is what primarily enables Metrolinx and Alstom to be unaccountable. This is something you could put in line with some simple short legislation.

I wouldn't say they are solely to blame, but they are problematic because they serve to obscure the accountability mechanisms that should exist in a public service while failing to deliver the benefits they were claimed to provide. Nobody owns the whole problem, so nobody fixes the whole problem. And in the meantime when something like this come to light, the crews alone are solely left to bear the burden of blame for a system that was never properly designed to protect them or the public in the first place.

As for your suggestion, I wholeheartedly agree with it.

 

[dowlingm]

This feels like it's solely blaming a P3 structure for these woes, I believe GO not being subject to Transportation Safety Board of Canada's jurisdiction is absolutely ridiculous, and is what primarily enables Metrolinx and Alstom to be unaccountable. This is something you could put in line with some simple short legislation.

Legislation by whom?

Queens Park? Sure - they could contract in the TSB as the rail accident investigator of record and put a provision in the relevant provincial statutes that the TSB can initiate investigations when it deemed appropriate as if it were an independent Ontario agency. However, any future government could repeal that.

Ottawa? If it was repealing provincial sovereignty over transportation solely within the province by an entity which is owned by that province occurring on rails owned by a provincially organized entity, I can't see it being simple.

 

[crs1026]

Authority over shortline railways historically was a federal matter, but oversight was delegated over the years from federal to provincial levels. This was seen as a win by the Provinces, as it removed Ottawa's nose from oversight of what was seen as essentially local businesses. Ottawa hasn't minded having less to worry about.

The issue is that the Province has never really built the necessary equivalent to federal transport regulatior or oversight, and has at times contracted the role back to Ottawa. The system may work for overseeing short lines that haul small amounts of freight over short distances at low speeds - but it's not up to the task for a very large passenger carrier that owns a great deal of track and rolling stock and carries huge numbers of people at high speed and frequency.

I question whether on matters of safety, any large bureaucracy can ever attain sufficient detachment and discipline to overcome its internal conflicts of interest. You can be sure that ML bureaucrats feel very happy that no one is really watching over them. Nobody likes government inspections and red tape, but independent challenge and monitoring is absolutely necessary otherwise organizations become complacent and rationalise away things that need higher performance standards and/or corrective action.

Creating contractual firewalls between politicians and transit operations generally has been hugely harmful to accountability. Everybody points to someone else. The politicians don't even necessarily have the data to manage the business, and can't speak to it publicly. It's just wrong.

- Paul

 

[Thaboss]

How is it not clear by now that this is a false narrative??

Because theres a deep rooted belief in many ppl that govt is inherently wasteful and incompetent. With the assumption being, that private industry is more effect, efficient, and most of all, more reliable at delivering projects of ALL kinds.

This is demonstrably false as you kindly pointed out. The truth is that private industry is better at hiding their waste and highlighting their profits, but ask anyone in accounts payable, how much private wastes and they'll tell you some things.

Simply put, the public sector recieves a level of scrutiny from both politicians and the public that the private sector can't even imagine. When the private sector fails due to strategic failures, we bail them out with billions and coddle them, see the failing American auto sector and housing industry for proof.

 

[crs1026]

Simply put, the public sector recieves a level of scrutiny from both politicians and the public that the private sector can't even imagine. When the private sector fails due to strategic failures, we bail them out with billions and coddle them, see the failing American auto sector and housing industry for proof.

The public sector has its own ways of shielding accountability and suppressing information. But - The process of regulating publicly trading companies is a lot more rigourous in terms of transparency on behalf of current or prospective investors. The teeth are a lot sharper. And there are more pundits and Bay Street analysts collecting data and monitoring corporate performance of major companies than there are journalists watching Metrolinx.

Privately owned companies may not get the same scrutiny, in that regard you are correct.

The public sector has FOI laws but these are clearly broken - and in this province, there is currently a shameless atttempt to unwrite a big piece of those.. And anyone who follows the endless stream of pressers and photo ops and tweets from ML knows that they are winning the battle to stay off the carpet.

- Paul

 

[Metroscapes]

The public sector has its own ways of shielding accountability and suppressing information. But - The process of regulating publicly trading companies is a lot more rigourous in terms of transparency on behalf of current or prospective investors. The teeth are a lot sharper. And there are more pundits and Bay Street analysts collecting data and monitoring corporate performance of major companies than there are journalists watching Metrolinx.

Privately owned companies may not get the same scrutiny, in that regard you are correct.

The public sector has FOI laws but these are clearly broken - and in this province, there is currently a shameless atttempt to unwrite a big piece of those.. And anyone who follows the endless stream of pressers and photo ops and tweets from ML knows that they are winning the battle to stay off the carpet.

- Paul

This is well put. Again, all I'm trying to highlight is that TSB investigations are an existing process / mechanism that already cut through public bureaucracy, commercial motives, and wherever they intersect with systemic industry issues.