News   Apr 20, 2026
 28     0 
News   Apr 17, 2026
 832     0 
News   Apr 17, 2026
 1.9K     6 

David Gunn: Ambition imperils our overextended transit system

M II A II R II K

Senior Member
Member Bio
Joined
Apr 24, 2007
Messages
3,948
Reaction score
1,069
Ambition imperils our overextended transit system


May 07 2010

David Gunn

thestar_logo.gif


Read More: http://www.thestar.com/opinion/edit...tion-imperils-our-overextended-transit-system

###########################################

Historically, Toronto has been justifiably proud of its transit system — the TTC. After WWII, it evolved into one of the most integrated, easy to use systems in the world, achieving a high level of usage among the population and requiring a minimum of government subsidy funds. In fact, it had the highest cost recovery — the percentage of total operating costs, including depreciation, paid for by the rider — in North America and, I believe, in western Europe. The system was clean, reliable and well-maintained. In 2000, cost recovery was 85 per cent, minimizing the operating subsidy. The system came through the blizzard of 1999 almost unscathed, a sign of well-maintained plant and equipment.

What made the TTC unique?

First, the integrated nature of the system allowed concentrating ridership on the most efficient routes and modes (bus, subway and streetcar). TTC riders are offered very easy transfers between modes. Most riders use multiple modes and routes on their journeys. Many interchange points have bus, subway and streetcar in the paid area. For example, St. Clair West is unique in the industry. Bus, subway and streetcars complement each other; they do not compete. In the past, the commission valued high cost recovery and efficiency and placed a high value on professional management. Strict economic standards were maintained for new and existing services. But all of a sudden that changed. Cost recovery dropped to 67 per cent in 2009. Politicians running for mayor are touting solutions that indicate no real grasp of the situation: privatization, alternate service delivery, splitting up the operation by giving the subways to Metrolinx and privatizing the buses, new fare collection systems, etc. All of the proposed changes are draped in the rhetoric of efficiency.

What happened and what needs to be done?

The TTC corporate structure is unchanged, with the management basically the same as it was in 1999, when I ceased to be chief general manager and cost recovery was 85 per cent. The management tools also are unchanged in terms of goal setting, organization, financial reporting and so on. The commission, though, has changed. Suddenly, cost recovery is no longer important. In response to the city’s official plan, a “ridership growth strategy†was adopted: marginal bus services were added; services that did not meet the economic standards of 1999 were approved; hundreds of new employees were hired; the bus fleet expanded; an additional bus garage was built; cost recovery dropped. In 10 years, the operating subsidy rose from $112 million to $442 million. Capital priorities also changed. Previously, the state-of-good-repair capital budget was the first priority. That’s the budget necessary to replace all of the system’s capital, including equipment, track and other facilities, necessary for the existing operation. Now, one of the largest expansions in history, Transit City, has priority.

The vision behind Transit City and the added services was well intended. The goal was to lessen Toronto’s dependence on automobiles by bringing high quality transit service to most residents. Unfortunately, implementation was flawed. It’s fine to set lofty goals, but implementation must be incremental. Sound management principals were marginalized and the lessons of history were ignored. The rapid transit expansion program (RTEP) of the early 1990s ended when fiscal and operational reality resulted in the abandonment of three of the four planned subway extensions — only the Sheppard Line survived. The TTC literally had to fill in holes that had been dug as part of the expansion program. The following statistics demonstrate the results of the current commission’s leadership between 2000 and 2009:

• Fares rose faster than the consumer price index (CPI), 32 per cent vs. 20 per cent.

• Contract settlements exceeded the CPI, 31 per cent vs. 20 per cent.

• The bus fleet grew from 1,468 vehicles to 1,782, or 21 per cent.

• Kilometres operated grew from 95 million to 124 million, or 31 per cent.

• Cost recovery dropped from 85 per cent to 67 per cent.

• Operating subsidy rose from $112 million to $442 million, or 395 per cent.

• Ridership grew from 411 million to 471 million, or 15 per cent.

###########################################
 
In the 1990s, a bunch of educated, successful American managers came riding into town to save Toronto's tarnishing institutions from the perils of Canadian small-mindedness. They were: Lou Turpen at the GTAA, Larry Richards at U of T's architecture school and David Gunn at the TTC. Some were ambitious, some were more restrained, but all of them were needed to prevent our city from collectively dying under Mike Harris.

David Gunn was my favourite of the lot. He was a pragmatic administrator who understood that growth cannot be achieved when the house is not in order. He did not give into political ideologies or fantasy visions. In his actions, he was very measured and he understood the dynamics of the transit system like almost no other chairman. In many ways, he is the stark opposite of someone like Adam Giambrone, who is passionate but impuslive and always ideologically-driven.

I know it's unsexy, but perhaps it's more important to get Toronto's current system running again before we tackle expansion of any kind, whether it is subways, LRT or even BRT. When we have militant unions, a rotten management system, a customer service problem, escalting fares and diminishing service, maybe it's time to put the shovels away and concentrate on fixing what we have.
 
David Gunn was my favourite of the lot. He was a pragmatic administrator who understood that growth cannot be achieved when the house is not in order. He did not give into political ideologies or fantasy visions. In his actions, he was very measured and he understood the dynamics of the transit system like almost no other chairman. In many ways, he is the stark opposite of someone like Adam Giambrone, who is passionate but impuslive and always ideologically-driven.

They also held different jobs. David Gunn was in charge of the day to day operations/expansion and Adam Giambrone was in charge of long term direction and vision.

Both were actually pretty well suited to their job description and probably would have made a pretty good team, particularly as most of Adam's direction/vision items could be implemented in phases giving the manager the opportunity to pick appropriate timing.
 
The TTCs purpose is to move people, not have a nice balance sheet. Gunn made the bean counters happy by cutting service, but that also made ridership shrink. I'm sure he dreams of a TTC that serves 40 rides a day but is profitable.
 
^No, he would probably dream of a TTC where everyday maintenance and operations weren't deferred in favour of vanity projects.

The cuts in service were somewhat inevitable given that Mike Harris slashed the TTC's funding; of course, fighting the cuts would have been the preferred option, but as we can see from our recent history, the provincial government always has the upper hand in these sorts of things. It was really down to either cutting maintenance and moving away from the "state of good repair" program, or cutting service/raising fares. Given the disastrous Russell Hill accident of 1995, it would have been politically unpalatable to do the former.
 
Two problems:

1) The escalation of fares, and the manner in which they are paid, are inappropriate. Before people even board, they already have a sour taste in their mouth.

2) The TTC's ridership has grown too large for the existing infrastructure. Problems arise when buses and streetcars are scheduled to run every 2 minutes, and when more people are trying to board the subway than the design capacity. Many lines are at the point where to solve a problem, you can't just throw more buses at it. New infrastructure is needed to adapt to the greater dependency on transit that exists today.

As for fare recovery, 85% is completely impractical as it prevented the TTC from providing the breadth of service that was necessary. Kudos to the TTC for doing a better job at balancing service quality with fare recovery. I'd rather be able to take a bus home late at night, or ride a new rapid transit line, than brag about 85% fare recovery.
 
As for fare recovery, 85% is completely impractical as it prevented the TTC from providing the breadth of service that was necessary. Kudos to the TTC for doing a better job at balancing service quality with fare recovery. I'd rather be able to take a bus home late at night, or ride a new rapid transit line, than brag about 85% fare recovery.

+1 All transit plans aside, I'd put my vote towards any candidate who vows to return funding for transit. Metrolinx could be the conduit for this funding. Everything else IMHO is just a charade and a distraction from this single most important issue. No other transit agency in North America, and maybe the world, works on this kind of fare recovery ratio.
 
If Transit City was all exclusive right-of-ways, that would be ambitious and more expensive.

To keep the cost down, but provide more rapid service to a larger area, that was probably the goal of Transit City. The roads department, the ones who control the traffic signals, would have been the next roadblock, since they are the ones who can really give transit the priority they need at the intersections.

However, even when keeping the the costs down, large parts of Transit City are being delayed and delayed, because of short-sighted people in high authority.
 

Back
Top