M II A II R II K
Senior Member
Ambition imperils our overextended transit system
May 07 2010
David Gunn
Read More: http://www.thestar.com/opinion/edit...tion-imperils-our-overextended-transit-system
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Historically, Toronto has been justifiably proud of its transit system — the TTC. After WWII, it evolved into one of the most integrated, easy to use systems in the world, achieving a high level of usage among the population and requiring a minimum of government subsidy funds. In fact, it had the highest cost recovery — the percentage of total operating costs, including depreciation, paid for by the rider — in North America and, I believe, in western Europe. The system was clean, reliable and well-maintained. In 2000, cost recovery was 85 per cent, minimizing the operating subsidy. The system came through the blizzard of 1999 almost unscathed, a sign of well-maintained plant and equipment.
What made the TTC unique?
First, the integrated nature of the system allowed concentrating ridership on the most efficient routes and modes (bus, subway and streetcar). TTC riders are offered very easy transfers between modes. Most riders use multiple modes and routes on their journeys. Many interchange points have bus, subway and streetcar in the paid area. For example, St. Clair West is unique in the industry. Bus, subway and streetcars complement each other; they do not compete. In the past, the commission valued high cost recovery and efficiency and placed a high value on professional management. Strict economic standards were maintained for new and existing services. But all of a sudden that changed. Cost recovery dropped to 67 per cent in 2009. Politicians running for mayor are touting solutions that indicate no real grasp of the situation: privatization, alternate service delivery, splitting up the operation by giving the subways to Metrolinx and privatizing the buses, new fare collection systems, etc. All of the proposed changes are draped in the rhetoric of efficiency.
What happened and what needs to be done?
The TTC corporate structure is unchanged, with the management basically the same as it was in 1999, when I ceased to be chief general manager and cost recovery was 85 per cent. The management tools also are unchanged in terms of goal setting, organization, financial reporting and so on. The commission, though, has changed. Suddenly, cost recovery is no longer important. In response to the city’s official plan, a “ridership growth strategy†was adopted: marginal bus services were added; services that did not meet the economic standards of 1999 were approved; hundreds of new employees were hired; the bus fleet expanded; an additional bus garage was built; cost recovery dropped. In 10 years, the operating subsidy rose from $112 million to $442 million. Capital priorities also changed. Previously, the state-of-good-repair capital budget was the first priority. That’s the budget necessary to replace all of the system’s capital, including equipment, track and other facilities, necessary for the existing operation. Now, one of the largest expansions in history, Transit City, has priority.
The vision behind Transit City and the added services was well intended. The goal was to lessen Toronto’s dependence on automobiles by bringing high quality transit service to most residents. Unfortunately, implementation was flawed. It’s fine to set lofty goals, but implementation must be incremental. Sound management principals were marginalized and the lessons of history were ignored. The rapid transit expansion program (RTEP) of the early 1990s ended when fiscal and operational reality resulted in the abandonment of three of the four planned subway extensions — only the Sheppard Line survived. The TTC literally had to fill in holes that had been dug as part of the expansion program. The following statistics demonstrate the results of the current commission’s leadership between 2000 and 2009:
• Fares rose faster than the consumer price index (CPI), 32 per cent vs. 20 per cent.
• Contract settlements exceeded the CPI, 31 per cent vs. 20 per cent.
• The bus fleet grew from 1,468 vehicles to 1,782, or 21 per cent.
• Kilometres operated grew from 95 million to 124 million, or 31 per cent.
• Cost recovery dropped from 85 per cent to 67 per cent.
• Operating subsidy rose from $112 million to $442 million, or 395 per cent.
• Ridership grew from 411 million to 471 million, or 15 per cent.
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May 07 2010
David Gunn
Read More: http://www.thestar.com/opinion/edit...tion-imperils-our-overextended-transit-system
###########################################
Historically, Toronto has been justifiably proud of its transit system — the TTC. After WWII, it evolved into one of the most integrated, easy to use systems in the world, achieving a high level of usage among the population and requiring a minimum of government subsidy funds. In fact, it had the highest cost recovery — the percentage of total operating costs, including depreciation, paid for by the rider — in North America and, I believe, in western Europe. The system was clean, reliable and well-maintained. In 2000, cost recovery was 85 per cent, minimizing the operating subsidy. The system came through the blizzard of 1999 almost unscathed, a sign of well-maintained plant and equipment.
What made the TTC unique?
First, the integrated nature of the system allowed concentrating ridership on the most efficient routes and modes (bus, subway and streetcar). TTC riders are offered very easy transfers between modes. Most riders use multiple modes and routes on their journeys. Many interchange points have bus, subway and streetcar in the paid area. For example, St. Clair West is unique in the industry. Bus, subway and streetcars complement each other; they do not compete. In the past, the commission valued high cost recovery and efficiency and placed a high value on professional management. Strict economic standards were maintained for new and existing services. But all of a sudden that changed. Cost recovery dropped to 67 per cent in 2009. Politicians running for mayor are touting solutions that indicate no real grasp of the situation: privatization, alternate service delivery, splitting up the operation by giving the subways to Metrolinx and privatizing the buses, new fare collection systems, etc. All of the proposed changes are draped in the rhetoric of efficiency.
What happened and what needs to be done?
The TTC corporate structure is unchanged, with the management basically the same as it was in 1999, when I ceased to be chief general manager and cost recovery was 85 per cent. The management tools also are unchanged in terms of goal setting, organization, financial reporting and so on. The commission, though, has changed. Suddenly, cost recovery is no longer important. In response to the city’s official plan, a “ridership growth strategy†was adopted: marginal bus services were added; services that did not meet the economic standards of 1999 were approved; hundreds of new employees were hired; the bus fleet expanded; an additional bus garage was built; cost recovery dropped. In 10 years, the operating subsidy rose from $112 million to $442 million. Capital priorities also changed. Previously, the state-of-good-repair capital budget was the first priority. That’s the budget necessary to replace all of the system’s capital, including equipment, track and other facilities, necessary for the existing operation. Now, one of the largest expansions in history, Transit City, has priority.
The vision behind Transit City and the added services was well intended. The goal was to lessen Toronto’s dependence on automobiles by bringing high quality transit service to most residents. Unfortunately, implementation was flawed. It’s fine to set lofty goals, but implementation must be incremental. Sound management principals were marginalized and the lessons of history were ignored. The rapid transit expansion program (RTEP) of the early 1990s ended when fiscal and operational reality resulted in the abandonment of three of the four planned subway extensions — only the Sheppard Line survived. The TTC literally had to fill in holes that had been dug as part of the expansion program. The following statistics demonstrate the results of the current commission’s leadership between 2000 and 2009:
• Fares rose faster than the consumer price index (CPI), 32 per cent vs. 20 per cent.
• Contract settlements exceeded the CPI, 31 per cent vs. 20 per cent.
• The bus fleet grew from 1,468 vehicles to 1,782, or 21 per cent.
• Kilometres operated grew from 95 million to 124 million, or 31 per cent.
• Cost recovery dropped from 85 per cent to 67 per cent.
• Operating subsidy rose from $112 million to $442 million, or 395 per cent.
• Ridership grew from 411 million to 471 million, or 15 per cent.
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