News   Apr 19, 2024
 5     0 
News   Apr 18, 2024
 721     0 
News   Apr 18, 2024
 6.8K     2 

VIA Rail

@Urban Sky - interesting that the 2019 changes have virtually eliminated westbound delays ex Toronto. I guess the eastbound delays were cascading equipment issues such that a trainset couldn't be spotted back from TMC maintenance/servicing in time?
Inbound crews in Toronto (locomotive engineers and on-train staff) are the same as outbound crews; therefore, if you want to make a turn-around in less than 8 hours, you would have to get completely new crews flown into Toronto - and this can easily be flight tickets for two dozen members of staff, especially in summer. Also, twice as many cleaners could clean the train quicker, but at a price.

However, you are right that it is no coincidence that the problems of late trains #2 delaying the departure of train #1 have been close to eliminated since the two timetable changes, as what used to be 94.5 hours (between departure of train #2 and departure of train #1) is now 27-51 hours more:
196763

Note: originally posted as post #4,775

^ Quebec - Montreal is roughly the same distance as Edmonton- Calgary, and that HxR project was costed at $1.5B some years ago. So yeah, I tend to think the price for this could be more than $1.1B.
Please feel free to locate the figures in this archive of studies and correct me if I'm wrong, but IIRC, the assumption was always that the rail corridor could not be shared as Edmonton-Calgary still forms an integral part of CP's national operations and this is the key difference between Edmonton-Calgary and Quebec-Montreal: the main concern of CN and CP will always be to maintain control on their infrastructure and operations, whereas a short line will prioritise minimising its operating costs...


***



The G&M article has a lot more detail. Was fantastic. Thanks Paul.
Given that I believe that I have a reasonably good idea of what data has been provided to E&Y, I'm more in the camp with those who find certain figures mentioned in the G&M article rather surprising, as I had the same reaction when reading it. But this is what you need to understand about this article: VIA has forwarded the data and studies requested by E&Y, but some of these files are highly technical documents prepared by engineering firms which are far more specialised in rail infrastructure projects than an accounting firm (and especially a mainstream - as in: generalist - newspaper, which has never seen the original studies themselves) could ever be. Therefore, I would take most figures with a grain of salt, maybe less those figures which match with those which have already been published previously, but certainly those which appear as counter-intuitive or even puzzling to the interested and reasonably well-informed reader...



Agreed. VIA is really dropping the ball here. This is the one segment that would benefit several markets and create a commuter market. Underspending here is foolish.

They really need institutional investors to stop them from shooting themselves in the foot.
Underspending would be foolish on alignments with many curves, as a later upgrade in design speed will require expensive realignments, which will void a significant proportion of the previous investment. Everywhere else, overspending is foolish, as any increase in the price tag will negatively effect the project's financial attractiveness to potential investors. As we have established multiple times, the minimum scheduled travel time between Ottawa and Montreal was exactly 1h35 in 2002-2005, which means that little (if any) investments are required to increase what the travel speeds the existing lines are capable of. Whatever bottlenecks might cause HFR trains frequent delays east of De Beaujeu can still be fixed by building additional track capacity after the opening of HFR and securing the necessary funds will be infinitely easier once HFR has been proven a success...


Yeah, it was a bit of a cheap shot, but really..... Ottawa can’t find that much money?

[...]

As you have noted, there is probably a standalone Ottawa-Montreal market that could be extracted, irrespective of the other segments of the route.
You seem to have missed that the center piece of any HxR proposal I am aware of has been to merge the Montreal-Ottawa, Montreal-Toronto and Ottawa-Toronto ("end-to-end") markets into one single rail service, which allows to exploit the economies of scale, which the VIA Fast study (a fascinating and highly recommended read, by the way!) correctly summarises as follows:
196769




I get that. But I'm questioning the number. This is crazy. They are saying they need to spend more on rolling stock than the recapitalization of the entire Corridor stock today. That's obviously more than just serving Kingston.
It's not the fact that they need more trains that is strange to me. It's the size of the procurement. It's bigger than the entire existing corridor fleet. And that comes along with a 25% improve in productivity with HFR.

Even assuming they spend something nuts like half a billion on the fleet based in Kingston, that's still a massive amount to bolster the HFR fleet.
You are assuming that the second batch (the "option") is identical with the base procurement, whereas in fact, the two are entirely different beasts, as clearly indicated in VIA's RFQ documents:

VIA Rail said:
(5) VIA Rail’s current Corridor services are provided on non-electrified infrastructure.
However, over the thirty year life cycle of the trainsets, VIA Rail intends to reduce its use of fossil fuels. Therefore, VIA Rail is working on a long term plan to build its own dedicated infrastructure for passenger service in the Corridor that could be electrified to reduce the use of fossil fuels and allow operation at up
to 125 mph. This long term plan has been presented by VIA Rail to its shareholder, the Government of Canada, and has yet to be approved. It should be noted that portions of the new routes on this infrastructure would remain non-electrified. Communities located in the current Corridor would also continue to be served by VIA Rail on the current non-electrified infrastructure.

(6) Options to acquire additional trainsets will be principally predicated on the Government of Canada's decision regarding VIA Rail's long term plan to build its own dedicated infrastructure. In the event that VIA Rail is given the authority to build its own infrastructure in the Corridor but such infrastructure is not electrified, then additional diesel only trainsets will be required to enable increased service frequencies. If VIA Rail is given the authority to build its own infrastructure and electrification is required, then the additional trainsets must be capable of both diesel and electric operation (dual-mode) at up to 125 mph, with seamless transition, and bi-directional operation. If the decision on VIA Rail's long term plan and the timeframe to implement this decision is not yet established at the time of the order for
the additional trainsets, then the delivery of the additional trainsets could be deferred until the decision and schedule is available.

The need for bi-mode operations (if operating diesel trains through the Mont-Royal tunnel) has already been established in the Ecotrain study (Deliverable 13, p.S-3) ...
196770

... as well as that such hybrid trainsets would be substantially more expensive than single-mode (i.e. diesel or electric) trainsets (Deliverable 6 [Part 2 of 2], p.45):
196771



No, thats some mysterious street called Eglington ?
Our internal QA processes have clearly been lacking when someone decided to share this map with a media outlet, as also evidenced by the spelling errors in the station names of Smiths Falls or L’Ancienne-Lorette and of course the abundance of red spell-checking lines in the map's legend...
 
Last edited:
I'm a bit bemused that certain people apparently think that a multi-billion dollar project is proposed to the taxpayer with its promoters basing their main cost and ridership estimates on back-of-the-envelope calculations. I really hope that you will one day get the chance to at least read some of these studies yourself, but just to make a point (and probably the only one I can safely do with these confidential documents), these are the properties of a folder in which I have copied all studies conducted for HFR on behalf of VIA by external companies, which I could find in a 20 minute raid of our shared HDD:

I think it's cute that you think 900MB is a ton of analysis and that you think it's significant advice to cabinet when you don't even have an MC for HFR yet. All that 900MB got you was $70M for an actual detailed study and EA. This is what will actually inform your cabinet submission. Post that hard drive snapshot when it's done.

That said, I'm happy that VIA has at least gotten to the point where real analysis and EAs are being funded. And that HFR is moving past the point where it's supported by reasonable ROMEs from outside contractors. This is more substantive than any previous rail study in the last half century. It's the furthest any actual intercity rail idea has gotten in at least a generation.

Underspending would be foolish on alignments with many curves, as a later upgrade in design speed will require expensive realignments, which will void a significant proportion of the previous investment. Everywhere else, overspending is foolish, as any increase in the price tag will negatively effect the project's financial attractiveness to potential investors. As we have established multiple times, the minimum scheduled travel time between Ottawa and Montreal was exactly 1h35 in 2002-2005, which means that little (if any) investments are required to increase what the travel speeds the existing lines are capable of.

I think we might be misunderstanding reach other. My point here is that a segment that has the potential to create a new market is worth the additional spending. And I mean substantial spending, which includes straightening out those problematic curves.

Admittedly might be a difference of opinion in how we see investment. I think ROI should drive capital commitment. And usually, if there's a project where you can create a captive market, ROI is decent.

You are assuming that the second batch (the "option") is identical with the base procurement, whereas in fact, the two are entirely different beasts, as clearly indicated in VIA's RFQ documents:
The need for bi-mode operations (if operating diesel trains through the Mont-Royal tunnel) has already been established in the Ecotrain study (Deliverable 13, p.S-3) ...
... as well as that such hybrid trainsets would be substantially more expensive than single-mode (i.e. diesel or electric) trainsets (Deliverable 6 [Part 2 of 2], p.45):

Correct some of my confusions here. VIA ordered 32 bi-directional sets with its order if I am not mistaken. And this is supposed to replace all of the existing Corridor capacity (40 locomotives, 160 coach cars). So should most of that not also serve on the HFR corridor?

Or is VIA purchasing an entirely new fleet for HFR (through options exercise or a new contract, whatever it is)? If that's the case, then there will be 32 trains for Lakeshore and Corridor West service. That seems like a lot.
 
Last edited:
Correct some of my confusions here. VIA ordered 32 bi-directional sets with its order if I am not mistaken. And this is supposed to replace all of the existing Corridor capacity (40 locomotives, 160 coach cars). So should most of that not also serve on the HFR corridor?

Or is VIA purchasing an entirely new fleet for HFR (through options exercise or a new contract, whatever it is)? If that's the case, then there will be 32 trains for Lakeshore and Corridor West service. That seems like a lot.

There are currently 27 trainsets operating in the corridor right now according to the cycling plan I posted a while back. One of these train sets operates on train 85/88 as a 2 car train paired with one locomotive (so it probably won't be replaced). Therefore, 32 trainsets are more than enough to replace the 26 real trainsets with room for expansion.
 
Last edited:
I think it's cute that you think 900MB is a ton of analysis and that you think it's significant advice to cabinet when you don't even have an MC for HFR yet. All that 900MB got you was $70M for an actual detailed study and EA. This is what will actually inform your cabinet submission. Post that hard drive snapshot when it's done.

That said, I'm happy that VIA has at least gotten to the point where real analysis and EAs are being funded. And that HFR is moving past the point where it's supported by reasonable ROMEs from outside contractors. This is more substantive than any previous rail study in the last half century. It's the furthest any actual intercity rail idea has gotten in at least a generation.



I think we might be misunderstanding reach other. My point here is that a segment that has the potential to create a new market is worth the additional spending. And I mean substantial spending, which includes straightening out those problematic curves.

Admittedly might be a difference of opinion in how we see investment. I think ROI should drive capital commitment. And usually, if there's a project where you can create a captive market, ROI is decent.





Correct some of my confusions here. VIA ordered 32 bi-directional sets with its order if I am not mistaken. And this is supposed to replace all of the existing Corridor capacity (40 locomotives, 160 coach cars). So should most of that not also serve on the HFR corridor?

Or is VIA purchasing an entirely new fleet for HFR (through options exercise or a new contract, whatever it is)? If that's the case, then there will be 32 trains for Lakeshore and Corridor West service. That seems like a lot.

The Renaissance trains in Quebec/East coast are getting near their EOL too, so perhaps once the HFR plan is done and some service is removed from the Corridor, the excess Siemens trainsets will replace the Renaissance fleet.
 
I'm a bit bemused that certain people apparently think that a multi-billion dollar project is proposed to the taxpayer with its promoters basing their main cost and ridership estimates on back-of-the-envelope calculations.

You left yourself wide open on that one, and I'm just too something to let it go - mostly in jest, but ..... the reality is that much of the GTA's transit planning has been napkin-thin, for decades now.

There's no doubt that VIA is doing an above average amount of due diligence on the project. Still, I think we ought to see more of the sums, and are not being unreasonable to offer laypersons' opinions in the absence of the detail. Trust implies verification. There is both an investor interest and a public policy interest in this project, and the government owes it to the public to show the detail.

As we have established multiple times, the minimum scheduled travel time between Ottawa and Montreal was exactly 1h35 in 2002-2005, which means that little (if any) investments are required to increase what the travel speeds the existing lines are capable of. Whatever bottlenecks might cause HFR trains frequent delays east of De Beaujeu can still be fixed by building additional track capacity after the opening of HFR and securing the necessary funds will be infinitely easier once HFR has been proven a success...

Three things - I suspect you may not be able to comment in specifics, but

a) Can we assume that the $91M allocation addresses whatever impediments caused VIA to adjust its timings from 1:35 to present day?
b) Where is the business case that says 1:35 is the optimal timing ? Suppose another X million could bring the timing down to (hypothetically) 1:20? What is the ROI on that increment? I would hope that VIA has not taken 1:35 as cast in stone.
b) I am surprised that amid all this due diligence, it is suggested that adding capacity east of De Beaujeu is not factored in or planned in the initial phase. At present CN runs 6 weekday trains each way to Toronto and 4 to Ottawa (with a fifth on Sundays). HFR will raise that to (per the documents) 15 each way and perhaps more (per our sidewalk speculation). It seems quite likely that CN will expect some further investment to protect its own capacity. I can't imagine CN not insisting that appropriate capacity be built before HFR is begun , especially if timings are being reduced and hence operating delays will be less tolerable. Moreover, leaving this investment to the variability of freight business and CN's judgement is risky - we know that taking a "wait and see" basis will push the decision to a breaking point, where CN will begin to favour freight over passenger as congestion develops in the future. That's a threat to revenue. How do we know that the added money will be available when CN requires it? What is the impact on the ROI if more is done right away?

- Paul
 
Last edited:
You left yourself wide open on that one, and I'm just too something to let it go - mostly in jest, but .....

It's also really not that significant if you work in government. Maybe because I'm in the military and billion dollar projects are the norm around here, we don't count anything as really substantial unless you're staffing a Memorandum to Cabinet. Everything before the MC is simply pissing around trying to convince the big wigs that your idea will really, really work, for reals.....

When some of these assessments start coming in and they start drafting the MC, we'll know that there's some actual serious support in government for HFR. Also, I predict that Johannes will be so busy when this phase hits that we won't hear from him for months!
 
There are currently 27 trainsets operating in the corridor right now according to the cycling plan I posted a while back. One of these train sets operates on train 85/88 as a 2 car train paired with one locomotive (so it probably won't be replaced). Therefore, 32 trainsets are more than enough the 26 real trainsets with room for expansion.

The 32 Siemens trainsets will only allow for an additional 1 or 2 trainsets available for service over the 26(-ish) used today.

There will be kept for Corridor service, however, a good number of Budd cars and F40 locos which will provide another 6 or 7 or 8 trainsets worth of actual service improvements over today's situation.

Dan
 
There's no doubt that VIA is doing an above average amount of due diligence on the project. Still, I think we ought to see more of the sums, and are not being unreasonable to offer laypersons' opinions in the absence of the detail. Trust implies verification. There is both an investor interest and a public policy interest in this project, and the government owes it to the public to show the detail.

I maybe the rare dissenter on this. I actually think there maybe a case for some commercial confidence for VIA to not make most of its analyses public. Particularly when all they have is a ROME and identification of problem points. 15 files and 900 MB sounds about right for the level of fidelity that lets you ask the government to spend on detailed study and some pre-procurement.

Everytime this kind of work gets released, public servants reach for the Tylenol, because the media just globs on to the negative points, ignoring the whole picture. And the nature of such analysis usually tends to highlight the risks more than the rewards.

I would like (hope to see) a detailed business case released in a year or two before they put out their RFP. It'd be nice to see what operational concepts and business models they considered. And how they stacked up after they actually have some ground truth on what it takes to build on the Havelock sub.
 
^ It was shown on their other maps.

View attachment 196740

2017 article:



I just noticed they show stations for Tweed and Sharbot Lake. That should attract ones of passengers.
 
I think it's cute that you think 900MB is a ton of analysis and that you think it's significant advice to cabinet when you don't even have an MC for HFR yet. All that 900MB got you was $70M for an actual detailed study and EA. This is what will actually inform your cabinet submission. Post that hard drive snapshot when it's done.
You are of course right that it would be ridiculous to assume that the depth of studies VIA has conducted so far with a budget of $4.4 million (IIRC, and I'm not even sure how much of that money was allocated to VIA directly, as opposed to TC) exceeds that of a study which will be funded with a funding envelope which is an order of magnitude larger! I somehow thought that you were referring to the study which the Globe&Mail obtained, even though you clearly weren't. I deleted the entire paragraph as it certainly doesn't fit to your comment I quoted, but since you keep referring to the total size and the number of files of said folders, I have to insist that these were just the files I would find most relevant to understand the scope of the external studies conducted on behalf of VIA. Neither number is indicative of the total scale and scope of studies conducted for HFR, both internally or externally, and therefore hardly relevant for this discussion.

That said, I'm happy that VIA has at least gotten to the point where real analysis and EAs are being funded. And that HFR is moving past the point where it's supported by reasonable ROMEs from outside contractors. This is more substantive than any previous rail study in the last half century. It's the furthest any actual intercity rail idea has gotten in at least a generation.
Certainly since the Turbotrain.

Correct some of my confusions here. VIA ordered 32 bi-directional sets with its order if I am not mistaken. And this is supposed to replace all of the existing Corridor capacity (40 locomotives, 160 coach cars). So should most of that not also serve on the HFR corridor?

Or is VIA purchasing an entirely new fleet for HFR (through options exercise or a new contract, whatever it is)? If that's the case, then there will be 32 trains for Lakeshore and Corridor West service. That seems like a lot.
So far the fleet procurement is independent of the HFR project, as it is a one-for-one replacement of the current corridor fleet, which has become obsolete and is in urgent need of replacement. Therefore, the fleet procurement is simply necessary to allow VIA to continue operating the current scale of corridor services. That said, the fleet will be "HFR-ready", which means it can operate on dedicated or legacy networks alike. However, a simple replacement of the current corridor fleet will not be enough to cover the legacy and HFR services. Therefore, the approval and funding of HFR will trigger a second batch of fleet delivery, which will either be identical to the first batch or require substantial modifications - depending on whether the ongoing interoperability studies convince the federal government that it is technologically and financially viable to build the REM in a way which does not preclude that the Mont-Royal tunnel is shared with HFR. In any case, HFR will rely on trains from the first and second batch...
 
Last edited:
I maybe the rare dissenter on this. I actually think there maybe a case for some commercial confidence for VIA to not make most of its analyses public. Particularly when all they have is a ROME and identification of problem points. 15 files and 900 MB sounds about right for the level of fidelity that lets you ask the government to spend on detailed study and some pre-procurement.

Everytime this kind of work gets released, public servants reach for the Tylenol, because the media just globs on to the negative points, ignoring the whole picture. And the nature of such analysis usually tends to highlight the risks more than the rewards.

I would like (hope to see) a detailed business case released in a year or two before they put out their RFP. It'd be nice to see what operational concepts and business models they considered. And how they stacked up after they actually have some ground truth on what it takes to build on the Havelock sub.

I’m familiar with the ‘data room’ approach where potential buyers or investors get to examine a project’s or company’s books in great detail on a very confidential basis. If HFR is a ROI-centric pitch, then one would expect that the data would be presented in whatever form and to whatever detail that bankers and investors and market analysts expect, all behind closed doors. If they find VIA’s engineering diligence sufficient, who are we to challenge VIA's cost estimates etc?

What’s vexing is the apparent intertwining of a public policy debate on top of this allegedly ROI-centric debate. The overriding issue seems to be that HFR needs some sort of financial "boost" from Ottawa - ie it is not a freestanding investable venture. The CIB/P3 journey is really just a way of trying to be "half pregnant". Unfortunately, TC seems to be more interested in studying and debating the ROI side, instead of leaving that debate to the bankers and capturing the true, and valid, public policy considerations - which in my view pertains more to the relative cost of alternatives, competitive equity, and green attributes. We should not be subsidising a money losing venture, but if the financial people say the project is marginal, then TC should be quantifying how much it is worth providing as subsidy to achieve those valid public objectives.....and then see if that pushes the project over the threshold.

There was a disturbing editorial in the (edit) Globe this week, which basically said, we have planes and highways, so HFR should only be pursued if the ROI is there. This is a viewpoint that is pretty easy to challenge, and if that's Ottawa's take, it's hugely shortsighted.

- Paul
 
Last edited:
I’m familiar with the ‘data room’ approach where potential buyers or investors get to examine a project’s or company’s books in great detail on a very confidential basis. If HFR is a ROI-centric pitch, then one would expect that the data would be presented in whatever form and to whatever detail that bankers and investors and market analysts expect, all behind closed doors. If they find VIA’s engineering diligence sufficient, who are we to challenge VIA's cost estimates etc?

What’s vexing is the apparent intertwining of a public policy debate on top of this allegedly ROI-centric debate. The overriding issue seems to be that HFR needs some sort of financial "boost" from Ottawa - ie it is not a freestanding investable venture. The CIB/P3 journey is really just a way of trying to be "half pregnant". Unfortunately, TC seems to be more interested in studying and debating the ROI side, instead of leaving that debate to the bankers and capturing the true, and valid, public policy considerations - which in my view pertains more to the relative cost of alternatives, competitive equity, and green attributes. We should not be subsidising a money losing venture, but if the financial people say the project is marginal, then TC should be quantifying how much it is worth providing as subsidy to achieve those valid public objectives.....and then see if that pushes the project over the threshold.

There was a disturbing editorial in the Toronto Star this week, which basically said, we have planes and highways, so HFR should only be pursued if the ROI is there. This is a viewpoint that is pretty easy to challenge, and if that's Ottawa's take, it's hugely shortsighted.

- Paul
It's a strange attitude we have in this country that driving and flying are the default way of getting around and rail is a largely unnecessary frill. The media are constantly reminding readers that Via Rail loses money but they never report about how much we subsidize the money losing highway system. It's very much a double standard.
 
I’m familiar with the ‘data room’ approach where potential buyers or investors get to examine a project’s or company’s books in great detail on a very confidential basis. If HFR is a ROI-centric pitch, then one would expect that the data would be presented in whatever form and to whatever detail that bankers and investors and market analysts expect, all behind closed doors. If they find VIA’s engineering diligence sufficient, who are we to challenge VIA's cost estimates etc?

What’s vexing is the apparent intertwining of a public policy debate on top of this allegedly ROI-centric debate. The overriding issue seems to be that HFR needs some sort of financial "boost" from Ottawa - ie it is not a freestanding investable venture. The CIB/P3 journey is really just a way of trying to be "half pregnant". Unfortunately, TC seems to be more interested in studying and debating the ROI side, instead of leaving that debate to the bankers and capturing the true, and valid, public policy considerations - which in my view pertains more to the relative cost of alternatives, competitive equity, and green attributes. We should not be subsidising a money losing venture, but if the financial people say the project is marginal, then TC should be quantifying how much it is worth providing as subsidy to achieve those valid public objectives.....and then see if that pushes the project over the threshold.

Welcome to Canadian public policy and governance. In my two decade military career, I've seen this across government, where public servants get so wrapped up in details instead of policy that they get lost in the weeds and end up with crap delivered by long, convoluted projects. A lot of it is simply our backwards, provincial political culture that doesn't really allow for deep national level policy formulation and political class that's largely reactionary.....to what's happening in the US. Not Canada. May sound like a rant, but it's my constant criticism in the workplace.

In this particular instance, you're absolutely right. It really looks like TC can't do its policy job properly and isn't letting VIA do its implementation and business planning jobs properly. Worse, TC seems to getting in the way of VIA and the CIB from properly and quickly coming up with a plan to deliver. So much time wasted with back and forth on VIA just to get them to all the EA and pre-procurement stage. They could have done this two years ago and be drafting the RFP with the CIB right now. I, honestly, don't blame VIA. I know how hard public servants like @Urban Sky work and how passionate they are. I blame the higher level bureaucrats at TC and this government for pissing around for so many years. I had the same experience on a multi-billion dollar procurement I worked on when the Conservatives were in power. It was infuriating.
 
There was a disturbing editorial in the Toronto Star this week, which basically said, we have planes and highways, so HFR should only be pursued if the ROI is there. This is a viewpoint that is pretty easy to challenge, and if that's Ottawa's take, it's hugely shortsighted.

This is a result of us having no real national transportation policy/strategy and simply subsdizing whatever is politically popular or appeals to various large corporate interests.

I really thought this government would be different. So many bright people in cabinet. What a waste.... They can't even seem to sell intercity rail in Southern Ontario based on their professed desire to tackle climate change.

It's a strange attitude we have in this country that driving and flying are the default way of getting around and rail is a largely unnecessary frill. The media are constantly reminding readers that Via Rail loses money but they never report about how much we subsidize the money losing highway system. It's very much a double standard.

It's not like the media is much better elsewhere. Politicians elsewhere are more motivated to deliver rail improvements though.
 

Back
Top